INQUIRY

MAGAZINE

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Karl Hess on Textbook Controversies

Thomas Szasz on Soviet Psychiatry

John Ehrlichman with a New Nixon Story

Bailing Out the Banks

PANAMA CANAL TREATY

By MURRAY N. ROTHBARD

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AS ONE EDITOR, WHO wishes to remain nameless, has conjectured, this issue is likely to blow a lot of minds. In the first place, there's that article about the Panama Canal treaty. As everybody knows, there are two sides to this issue. On one side are the good guys, and you-know-who is on the other. Right? You will be surprised. There is also a liberal's argument against handgun control and a radical's explanation of the West Virginia textbook controversy. Do not despair, gentle reader. We are still with you in the fight for truth, justice, and the American way of life.

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RES PUBLICA

What a relief

■ A total ban on nuclear test explosions, as proposed last week by Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev, would not prevent production of neutron warheads by the United States, Defense Secretary Harold Brown said Sunday. . . .

In the televised interview, Brown indicated the proposed test ban would not prevent the United States from going ahead with other new weapons projects, such as cruise missiles and the MX mobile missile, because these systems could use warheads that have already been fully tested. "It is always possible to adapt an existing warhead that has been designed for one weapons system to another weapons system without necessarily conducting a nuclear test," Brown said.

—Los Angeles Times, Nov. 7, 1977

You sure showed 'em, Griff

■ Atty. Gen. Griffin B. Bell Tuesday rejected criticism of the Richard M. Helms case as a double standard of justice, asserting: "In my judgment, it's only the well-to-do that ever go to prison." . . .

Bell bristled at the question of whether the agreement amounted to a "virtual license" for CIA directors to testify untruthfully. "It's just the opposite," he said. "It seems to me this sets the nation out on a new course. People do have to respond to the law."

—Los Angeles Times, Nov. 2, 1977

Stonewalling in South Africa

■ James T. Kruger, South Africa's minister of police and justice, admitted Wednesday that black nationalist Steve Biko died of brain injuries while in police custody but said "a man can damage his brain in many ways." Kruger said there was no police involvement in the death of Biko in September, "as far as I know of." He added, "There are all sorts of possibilities." . . .

Asked if the medical evidence was compatible with self-inflicted wounds, Kruger said, "I don't know if they were self-inflicted. But I often think of banging my own head against a wall."

—Los Angeles Times, Nov. 10, 1977

Who, indeed?

■ Despite a rule against collecting personal data on individuals, the FBI continues to gather such information as the fact that one member of a suspect group carried on "a short affair" with a member of two other groups, congressional investigators said Wednesday. . . . In a report submitted to the House judiciary subcommittee on civil and constitutional rights, the General Accounting Office said that despite improvements in the direction and control of domestic intelligence, "there are still few visible results."

The review found that only 10 of the 319 cases sampled had produced advance information of planned violent activities or information that helped solve related criminal investigations or led to items apparently intended for criminal use.

"Realistically this may be the best that can be expected," the GAO conceded. "Who is to say that the FBI's continuous coverage of 'subversives' or 'extremist' groups and their key leaders has not prevented them from achieving their goals?"

—Los Angeles Times, Nov. 10, 1977

More wisdom from the bench

■ Persons who rely on the Supreme Court test that says some thing is obscene only if it has no redeeming value are "depraved, mentally deficient, mind-warped queers," the Utah Supreme Court said in upholding a local obscenity ordinance yesterday.

—Washington Post, Oct. 29, 1977

The case of the prescient prosecutor

■ The FBI—under orders by former Director J. Edgar Hoover to "neutralize" antiwar activist Tom Hayden—conducted a 16-year investigation into Hayden's private and public life through January of last year, according to FBI documents. . . .

According to the released material, the FBI was told five months before the start of the Chicago Seven Conspiracy Trial, in which Hayden was a defendant, that the defendants and their attorneys would likely be cited for contempt of court for statements they would make "during the trial." They were.

The FBI was "confidentially advised" of this by U.S. Atty. Thomas Foran, who prosecuted the case, after he met with trial Judge Julius Hoffman.

—Los Angeles Times, Nov. 4, 1977

Now that's what we call a sweet deal

■ The United States and 71 other countries have signed a new international sugar agreement that creates, in effect, a worldwide cartel of sugar producers, and guarantees that the price of sugar will double from its present market value of 7 cents a pound. The cartel relieves the administration of the embarrassment of paying the enormous, direct subsidy to American sugar producers that was voted by Congress last summer. And it proves again that government can do things that private corporations can't—unless they get the government to do it for them. As the *National Journal* commented, "If [the sugar agreement] had involved U.S. companies—not government—the negotiators could have been jailed for violating the antitrust laws."

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Secretary Brown's dirty little secret

Launch on warning

IN A WORLD WHERE BOTH THE UNITED States and Russia have enough nuclear weapons to reduce each other's homelands to moonscapes, the only rational nuclear strategy is one that lowers the possibility that those weapons will ever be used. Certainly, any policy that actually increases the chances that nuclear weapons might be launched in error has to be considered the most dangerous sort of folly. Yet, according to testimony by the new Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, which was given in closed session September 15 and released in mid-October by the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, that is precisely the sort of policy the Carter administration is pursuing.

The name of the policy is "launch on warning"—or as Brown prefers, "launch under attack." By either name what this means is that the United States would launch its intercontinental ballistic missiles against Russia once its warning systems showed that Russian missiles were headed toward the United States. The idea itself is not new; over the past 10 years war planners have proposed it now and again as a way to save our ICBM force from possible destruction—the old shoot 'em or lose 'em philosophy, as it is sometimes called—and each time it has been discarded as unacceptably dangerous.

Brown's own tortured answers and nonanswers before the House subcommittee only emphasize what a thoroughly disreputable idea it is. "It is not our doctrine to do so," said Brown at one point in answer to a question about launch on warning. "Neither is it our doctrine that under no circumstances would we ever do so." Or, as Brown might have put it if he had not been trying so hard to disguise his dirty little secret: Yes, it is our doctrine that under some circumstances we would. Taken as a whole Brown's testimony leaves no room for doubt that the United States considers launch on warning a part of its overall nuclear strategy.

The problem with launch on warning begins, of course, with the possibility that the signals from our elaborate warning system of radars and satellites might be false, or that the giant computers that receive and interpret the data from them might be in error. Just last year, for example, the Pentagon reported that one of its infrared sensing satellites had been struck by what appeared to be a Russian "laser beam." As it turned out, the satellite's electronic system simply misdiagnosed the flare from a gas-line fire in central Russia. Brown and other proponents of the policy obviously prefer the term "launch under attack" because it makes everything seem more certain than it actually is.

Time is another consideration. It takes approximately 30 minutes for an intercontinental ballistic missile to travel the distance between Russia and the United States. According to military experts, it would be 10 minutes before our radars picked up the missile; that would leave no more than 20 minutes for the president, with the advice of his generals, who would be watching the computer displays and conferring with their own experts, to decide whether or not to launch this country's ICBMs and initiate an all-out nuclear war. How could the president—how could anyone—be certain? There would be no time for deliberation, not even time for second thoughts. Under the policy of launch on warning, nuclear war would be launched by a finger resting on a hair trigger.

As must be clear to anyone who has not already spent too many years calculating the trade-offs between budget dollars and megadeaths, a launch-on-warning policy is both morally and intellectually bankrupt. (Even Harold Brown, that old systems analyst, seemed slightly embarrassed to be discussing it before a congressional audience.) It would be a mistake, however, for us to dismiss launch on warning as a wrong-headed aberration from an otherwise sensible nuclear strategy.

Launch on warning is significant in its own right because it heightens the risk of a nuclear war—and Secretary Brown and his boss Jimmy Carter should be made to defend their support of this reckless policy. But it is also important because it points to deeper flaws in our nuclear strategy. It should be remembered that the justification for launch on warning is that it is necessary for the protection of our land-based missiles. As the accuracy of Soviet missiles increases, the argument goes, our ICBMs will become increasingly vulnerable to attack. Hence, the need for launch on warning (or, as also proposed, for ICBMs on mobile launchers, a program that will cost $30 to $40 billion).

There is, however, another alternative that the Pentagon refuses to consider. The United States already has more than enough nuclear weapons on submarines and bombers to ensure deterrence; increasingly, our ICBMs are becoming little more than targets. Under the circumstances, the only sensible policy is for us to get rid of our land-based missiles—not to devise new and dangerous ways to protect them.

Launch on warning is the crazy leading edge, the *reductio ad absurdum,* of our entire nuclear strategy, and the administration's attempt to revive it serves only to point out the bankruptcy of that strategy as a whole. ❑

What sort of reform is this?

Psychiatric imprisonment

CONGRESS IS AT PRESENT CONsidering a new federal criminal-code reform bill (S 1437) that—in the words of its co-sponsor, Senator Edward M. Kennedy—would "streamline and restructure" the laws on crime that have been passed by Congress over the past 200 years.

Thus far, opposition to the bill has been led by such organizations as the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation and the American Civil Liberties Union. These groups have focused on threats to freedom of speech, press, petition, and assembly that are found in various provisions of the bill.

However, other civil liberties questions must also be raised about S. 1437. These are questions concerning the bill's provisions for in

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voluntary placement of persons—the accused as well as convicted criminals—in mental hospitals. Such important questions deserve more public attention than they have thus far received.

Under S. 1437, a person accused of any federal misdemeanor or felony can, at the initiative of the government, be put into a mental hospital for 30 days to have psychiatrists evaluate his competency to stand trial. At the same time, the psychiatrists determine whether, in their opinion, the as yet unconvicted person should be put away in a mental hospital for an indefinite period. The same examination and determination can, again at the initiative of the government, be ordered for criminals after their trials.

What is troubling in these provisions is their reliance on the seldom questioned assumption that institutional psychiatry should be part of the criminal justice system. Instead of standing apart as a form of counseling of the distressed, done at their initiative, psychiatry has been integrated into the official decisions on whom to lock up.

After the exposure received by psychiatric practices in the Soviet Union and the questions that have been raised about the involuntary hospitalization of such persons as Ezra Pound and General Edwin Walker, these aspects of the bill come as something of a shock. The Senate Judiciary Committee rejected Senator Malcolm Wallop's amendment that would have made psychiatric examination an option that could be chosen only by the defendant. The Judiciary Committee likewise rejected Wallop's amendment that would have diluted the authority of psychiatrists by placing lay persons, lawyers, and members of the clergy on psychiatric examination boards.

These amendments would by no means have disengaged psychiatry from the judicial process or the penal system. But their rejection by the committee indicates that Congress remains comfortable with the power that institutional psychiatry wields over persons caught up in the criminal justice process. ❑

In the face of tyranny

The courage of Kim Dae Jung

ACCORDING TO A RECENT DISpatch from Korea (Agence France-Presse, October 23), Kim Dae Jung, Korea's most prominent political prisoner, is in failing health. In May, Amnesty International issued a report warning that the 52-year-old Kim's health was poor; the further deterioration of his condition that is indicated by this latest bulletin must thus be viewed with alarm. We bring this to your attention, because, as far as we know, no major newspaper in this country considered it news fit to print. Heroes should not be so easily forgotten.

Kim Dae Jung's story should be familiar to Americans who support the cause of liberty. After finishing as runner-up to Park Chung Hee—who had already established himself as dictator of South Korea—in the presidential election of 1971, Kim traveled to the United States and Japan to rally opposition to the Park regime. In 1973 he was kidnapped from his hotel in Japan by agents of the Korean government and taken to Korea. There he was charged with violating election laws, and after a prolonged trial, in 1975 he was convicted and sentenced to one year in prison. The sentence, however, was not carried out at that time. The strategy, it seems clear, was to leave the sentence hanging over Kim's head in the hope that he would be persuaded to moderate his opposition.

However, this was not to be. On March 22, 1976, Kim and 12 other prominent Koreans published a Declaration of Democracy, in which they called for the release of all political prisoners, the abolition of torture in South Korea's prisons, the restoration of freedom of the press, and the repeal of the 1972 constitution empowering Park Chung Hee to rule by emergency decree.

Since, under Korea's Emergency Decree No. 9, all criticism of the Park regime is forbidden, Kim was once again arrested and brought to trial. This time the trial was brief. On May 1, Kim was sent to prison to serve a six-year sentence (five years for signing the Declaration plus the original one year for his supposed violation of election laws).

A statement by an unnamed aide to President Park, quoted in a recent article in the *New Republic* (September 17), reveals what an extraordinary act of courage it took for Kim and the others to sign the Declaration. Although the statement—like the *New Republic* article—is aimed at justifying the government's repressive action, it succeeds, like the article, in doing exactly the opposite. "But what could he (President Park) do?" asks the aide rhetorically. "They laid a trap by doing exactly what they knew would get them arrested. If a government is going to have any integrity at all, it has to abide by its own rules."

It is clear that Kim Dae Jung and the other signers knew what the consequences of their act would be. Kim especially, who was already living under the threat of imprisonment for what can only be described as trumped-up charges, knew that his act of defiance would land him in jail. But he, and the others, also knew that not to defy Park Chung Hee, openly and unmistakably, would betray their ideals and their countrymen. In a closed society like the one in South Korea today, where there is no hope of recourse to an independent judiciary or even to public opinion, this is the cruelest sort of choice anyone can be called upon to make. It is an act of courage and nobility, and Kim Dae Jung, who sits in solitary confinement in a cell in Jinjoo prison, in failing health, shall not be forgotten. ❑

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THOMAS SZASZ

Soviet psychiatry: The historical background

FOR THE PAST DECADE THE Western press has been waxing indignant over what it calls the political misuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union. This is a case of selective indignation with a vengeance.

The facts are not in dispute. As is usually the case with vexing political and social problems, what is in dispute is the interpretation of the facts. The Western interpretation—both in the popular press and in recent psychiatric journals—is that suppressing dissidents by incarcerating them in insane asylums is an aberration of the Soviet political system and a misuse of Soviet psychiatry. The Communist interpretation—both inside and outside Russia—is that the persons Western critics call "dissidents" are in fact schizophrenics whose hospitalization and treatment are necessitated by their psychiatric illnesses. I shall argue that both interpretations are incorrect and immoral.

Were the persecution and torture of heretics an aberration of the Inquisition and a misuse of the Inquisitors' clerical powers? Were the degradation and disfranchisement of Negroes an aberration of chattel slavery and a misuse of the slaveholders' powers? Were the systematic killing of German mental patients and the concealment of these medical murders by means of false death certificates an aberration of National Socialism and misuses of the Nazi psychiatrists' powers? The answer, with these matters safely behind us, is in each case obviously no. We now recognize each of these "aberrations" and "misuses" for what they were: integral parts of the Inquisition, of chattel slavery, and of National Socialism. The situation is the same with Institutional Psychiatry: It has no aberrations or misuses, because it is itself an aberration and misuse—of medicine.

It behooves us, then, to recognize that the modern Communist state and the modern non-Communist (or "free") state are equally hostile to those who challenge their core values: Each resorts to the psychiatric repression of the challengers. We must do so not out of any fairness toward the Communist tyrants (who do not deserve it), but for ourselves. If we deny that the practice of disposing of deviants by imprisoning them in madhouses flourished long before Khrushchev—indeed, long before Stalin or even Marx; if we deny that the psychiatric suppression of dissent has been an integral part of all modern Western societies—then we deny ourselves the possibility of understanding the present situation in psychiatry, East and West, and thus make it impossible to assume an intelligent and responsible attitude toward it.

NO RECENT COMMUNIST INvention, the psychiatric incarceration of "dissidents" in insane asylums is actually the oldest trick in the psychiatric bag. The first step in the history of psychiatry was the building of madhouses. This development, which began in the seventeenth century, created two symmetrical populations: the keepers and the kept. Populating madhouses with madmen and mad-doctors generated the second step: It consisted of the keepers monopolizing the privilege of identifying and classifying the conduct both of themselves and their charges. The third step—the so-called "moral treatment" in psychiatry, covering approximately the first half of the nineteenth century—lay in the recognition that madmen were categorized as ill not because they were sick but because they misbehaved. However, this realization was inconsistent with the medical pretensions of the psychiatrists and the medical justifications used for confining persons innocent of lawbreaking. Thus, the fourth step consisted of medicalizing madness and mad-doctoring: Everything the madman did or was accused of doing became a manifestation of his mental illness; everything the mad-doctor did or claimed to do became a method of his mental treatment. This achievement is associated with the names of Emil Kraepelin, Eugen Bleuler, and Sigmund Freud. Since the turn of the last century, then, the prestige and power of psychiatry have grown steadily throughout the world.

Institutional psychiatry has no aberrations or misuses, because it is itself an aberration and misuse—of medicine.

The now flourishing practice of involuntary mental hospitalization is no less than 300 years old.[1] Let us look at some of the high spots in that story by way of constructing the proper historical backdrop against which to view present-day psychiatric practices on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Philippe Pinel (1745–1826) is generally believed to have "liberated" the madman. He did nothing of the sort. He merely replaced chains with more subtle forms of restraint: He advocated "intimidation, without severity; oppression, without violence, and triumph, without outrage." How little Pinel's views on psychiatric repression differ from those popular today may be gleaned from his following recommendation concerning the proper management of madmen: "To render the effects of fear solid and durable, its influence ought to be associated with that of profound regard. For that purpose, plots must be either avoided or so well managed as not to be discovered; and coercion must always appear to be the result of necessity, reluctantly resorted to and commensurate with the violence or petulance which it is intended to correct."

Benjamin Rush (1746–1813), the father of American psychiatry—his portrait adorns the seal of the American Psychiatric Association—was also an enthusiastic advocate of psychiatric coercion. Typical of his opinions was the following: "Mankind considered as creatures made for immortality are worthy of all our cares. Let us view them as patients in a hospital. The more they resist our efforts to serve them, the more they have need of our services." As one "treatment," he advocated terror: "Terror acts powerfully upon the body, through the medium of the mind, and should be employed in the cure of madness."

IF INDIVIDUALS INCARCERATED in insane asylums were, and are, so treated, it would seem obvious that such confinement would cause suffering to the inmate regardless of his mental state—

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[1] My book *The Age of Madness*, subtitled "The History of Involuntary Mental Hospitalization *Presented in* Selected Texts," is a documented account of that history.

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that is, regardless of whether he is a "sane dissident" or an "insane patient." Nevertheless, all the victims of contemporary Soviet psychiatry—with the sole exception of Valery Tarsis—emphasize the "injustice" of incarcerating "sane dissidents" in mental hospitals, thus implying that the psychiatric incarceration of "insane patients" is just and proper. Even Alexander Solzhenitsyn blunders badly when it comes to this point. In 1970, protesting Zhores Medvedev's "mental hospitalization," Solzhenitsyn wrote: "The incarceration of freethinking healthy people in madhouses is spiritual murder . . . a variant of the gas chamber, and even more cruel."

But if involuntary psychiatric interventions—officially called "hospitalization" and "treatment," but actually imprisonment and torture—are moral obscenities comparable to Nazi crimes, then how could such methods be acceptably applied to any human being, well or sick, friend or foe? What is there about "mental illness" that makes a "mentally ill" person a fit victim for such crimes against humanity? We must keep in mind that when we condemn and and eschew some types of human conduct as beyond the pale of morality—whether it be gassing people in rooms disguised as shower stalls, or destroying their brains by means of chemicals or electricity in prisons disguised as hospitals—we do so not only to protect the victims from torture, but also to protect those in charge of them, and society as a whole, from the barbarization inherent in and engendered by such acts. Thus, the question which we as well as the Russians must answer is whether involuntary psychiatric interventions are crimes against humanity, as I have maintained for the past 25 years—or whether they are therapeutic methods aimed at curing mentally sick patients of their diseases, as is the official view of both American and Russian psychiatry.

It is important to recall, in this connection, that the psychiatric imprisonment of sane persons was explicitly authorized by the commitment statute of the State of Illinois enacted in 1851, which stated: "Married women . . . may be entered or detained in the hospital [the state asylum at Jacksonville] at the request of the husband of the woman . . . without evidence of insanity required in other cases." No Soviet psychiatrist has ever made such a claim!

Much has been made of the fact that Soviet psychiatrists regard Russian intellectuals who oppose Communist slavery and want to escape from it as insane. In 1851, in a paper entitled "Report on the Diseases and Physical Peculiarities of the Negro Race," published in the then prestigious *New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal*, Dr. Samuel A. Cartwright—speaking as the chairman of a committee appointed by the Medical Association of Louisiana to investigate the "diseases peculiar to the Negro race"—asserted that black slaves who refuse to work for their masters and seemingly inadvertently destroy their property suffer from the disease he called "dysaesthesia Aethiopis," while those who run away to the free states suffer from the disease he called "drapetomania." Here is how Cartwright explained his choice of the name for the disease that "causes the slave to run away": "Drapetomania is from 'drapetes,' a runaway slave, and 'mania,' mad or crazy. . . . The cause, in the most of the cases, that induces the negro to run away from service, is as much a disease of the mind as any other species of mental alienation, and much more curable, as a general rule." I leave the treatments Cartwright recommended for curing these diseases to the reader's imagination.

IN 1904, THE AUSTRIAN SATIRIST Karl Kraus denounced the psychiatric incarceration of a Hapsburg princess by no less prominent a psychiatrist than Julius von Wagner-Jauregg, then the professor of psychiatry at the University of Vienna and subsequently the recipient of a Nobel prize in medicine. What was the nature of the princess's mental illness? She wanted to leave her noble husband and marry a commoner!

The world has changed a great deal since those days. But psychiatry has remained much the same. "Dissidents" have always been legally and psychiatrically fit subjects for involuntary mental hospitalization, and they still are. What has changed is the contours and contents of dissidence. Before the Civil War in America, being a Negro and wanting to escape from slavery constituted dissidence. In Russia today, wanting to "reform" Marxism or escape from it by emigration constitutes dissidence.

Here are some of the criteria American psychiatrists used in the 1960s to ascertain dissidence. According to the Massachusetts commitment laws then in force, a person was a fit subject for psychiatric incarceration if, in the opinion of psychiatrists, he was "likely to conduct himself in a manner which clearly violates the established laws, ordinances, conventions, or morals of the community." In 1961, Dr. Francis Braceland, one of the leading American psychiatrists and a former president of the American Psychiatric Association, offered the following criterion for commitability to a Senate committee looking into the "rights of mental patients": "If a man brings his daughter to me from California, because she is in manifest danger of falling into vice or in some way disgracing herself, he doesn't expect me to let her loose in my hometown for that same thing to happen."

I could go on. But enough! If someone wants to believe that the "abuses" of Soviet psychiatry are the misuses of a medically and morally respectable system of healing rather than the characteristic uses of a traditionally totalitarian system of social control, nothing can stop him. If someone wants to believe that the incarceration of "sane" persons in insane asylums is a peculiarly Russian practice or is a political abuse of psychiatry invented and employed only by the Soviets, evidently nothing will stop him. Those who hold such a view will welcome a new book by Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway, entitled *Psychiatric Terror*, which I will review in a later column. ❑

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EDUCATION

KARL HESS

Not going by the book

WHEN IN SOPHISTICATED COMpany, I now anticipate what has become a standard reaction to my mentioning that I live in West Virginia: "Oh, isn't that where those terrible people burned the schoolbooks?"

I am able to reply that although a few books may have been burned as a gesture, an entire series of supplementary readers were banned—and a schoolhouse was dynamited.

It all took place in Kanawha County, and from the widespread coverage given the incident, in 1974, it would be possible to imagine it represented merely a hillbilly aberration, a crude mountaineer reaction to supposed enlightenment. A more accurate description, I feel, would be that it was an attempt (eventually successful) by local people to have a say in the selection of the textbooks from which local children will be expected to learn.

Although my neighbors were responsible for the loudest protest against elite or purely administrative selection of textbooks, they were not alone. People in Dallas went to court and won a similar right to be heard in the selection of textbooks. A substantial case of the same sort is headed toward a court hearing in the Island Trees school district in New York, where the local superintendent of schools has dared suggest that local decisions be made by local folk and not by the American Civil Liberties Union, which has protested parental pressure to select (and thus also reject) texts. Such groups as the Heritage Foundation, which monitors local school resistance, predict that morend more, rather than fewer, suits will be brought to resist federal or even state encroachment on local preference.

Unfortunately for the broader issues involved, the most visible reason for the acts of resistance will continue to be efforts to include at least the idea that the world was created by God (creationism), as one of the several explanations of the development of life on earth. Because of that Biblical emphasis, it is inevitable that the resistances will be widely seen as simple cases of religion versus science, of the archaic versus the modern, the conservative versus the liberal, the grumpy versus the genteel.

There is another way to describe the contestants. They could be described as embattled, deeply prejudiced minorities fighting against overwhelming, prejudiced majoritarianism.

Because I am a West Virginian, the Kanawha County resistance was personally moving and confusing. To read about it, it was simply and solely a gang of religious fundamentalists outraged by repeated references to Christianity as a myth in some texts proposed as supplemental readers. The concerns did emphasize the religious, to be sure. But there were others.

For instance, standard English sentences and pronunciation are treated as a dialect, as a second language, which indeed it is in many parts of the country. However, in these texts, country and regional dialects are not given weighty emphasis as alternatives. Instead, inner-city "jive" talk dominates. In a section reflecting adversely on what is seen as a Western error of thinking of things in black-and-white terms, the texts suggest that the Chinese have a more accurate world view by thinking in terms of gray. This simplistic ignoring of the immense body of Western relativism, and even the eternal gray of the scientific method is simply a prejudice pretending to be objective.

PERHAPS THE MOST NOTABLE example of disputed textbooks is that of a social science curriculum, including booklets and films for grammar school children, entitled MACOS (Man, a Course of Study). MACOS became a controversy in Montclair, New Jersey; Mahwah, New Jersey; Syracuse, New York; Phoenix, Arizona; San Antonio, Texas; and Prince George's County, Maryland.

The project, begun in 1963, is a creature of the state from beginning to end. It was funded, originally, by a $4.8 million grant from the National Science Foundation to the Education Development Center. When no publisher could be found to print and distribute what the Center came up with, NSF came up with an additional quarter of a million dollars so that the authors could put it out themselves. Then, NSF added $2.16 million more to implement use of the MACOS material in some 1700 schools whose progressive teachers wanted it to modernize their classroom materials. MACOS was seen as very much "with it."

Wherever parental objections arose to the material, MACOS was defended (1) as representing merely factual material, and (2) as seeking to teach students to think freely for themselves rather than being bound by local custom or parental prejudice.

The first proposition is debatable and complex. The second proposition is not. It falls under the weight of its own logical contradiction. The MACOS texts do, indeed, ask children to think for themselves but, as is the nature of texts of this sort, they are asked to think about those things which, first of all, are suggested by the text and, further, to think about them in ways inevitably and inexorably suggested by the text. That is, MACOS has a point of view, and it has, as a text is bound to, many examples to illustrate it. A student, therefore, may well be asked to think—but only about those things given the weighty authority of inclusion in the text and in those styles also given weighty authority by the examples of the text.

This is not to suggest that the motivation for the MACOS material is either conspiratorial or vicious. It is, regardless of motivation, simply self-limiting and incapable of fulfilling the mission of teaching children to think for themselves. To teach children to think for themselves would require, not exemplary texts at all, but long participatory exercises in the logical analysis of *whatever the students themselves* are sufficiently familiar with to discuss. In particular, thinking for themselves would involve the students having the space to question school authority itself—a form of questioning

A local superintendent of schools has dared suggest that local decisions be made by local folk and not by the American Civil Liberties Union, which has protested parental pressure to select (and thus also reject) texts.

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

which MACOS does not encourage except in terms of questioning school *boards* and parental authority. Also, the exercises in questioning are by and large confined to classroom exercises, with one section of the MACOS teaching manual suggesting that classroom discussions not be repeated at home.

As to the notion that MACOS presents objective knowledge, there is at least an argument. Much of the material is based upon the highly selective and not clearly objective notion that human behavior may be accurately explained by studying the behavior of other animals. Additionally, the course of study in its human areas concentrates on the activities of a single Eskimo tribe that practiced geronticide, and from them deduces, suggests, and implies a wide range of behavioral comments on the culture of students reading the books.

IN KANAWHA COUNTY THERE WAS an explicit cultural objection also. It concerned the inner-city emphasis of the books, which seemed insane to the rural poor. There was also objection to the supplemental texts' incessant emphasis on, and *implied acceptance of*, violence, particularly the violence of inner-city people. For the children of coal miners whose own lives are lived in violence also, the glorification of inner-city youth gangs must have seemed highly selective. And for an area of the country that has had relatively few racial clashes, the incessant theme of black-white hatred (with a curious use of the disparaging phrase "whitey" even while preaching against bigotry!) must also seem discordant.

This emphasis on violence had a wonderfully ironic twist in Kanawha County. Some of the irate parents, being skilled workmen whose jobs often include the use of explosives, blew up one of the schools as an expression of their outrage. Needless to say, the proponents of the texts, who might view inner-city violence as glories of creative expressionism, did not seem beguiled by the country version.

In all of the coverage accorded the Kanawha County resistance, beginning in 1974 and continuing through the jailing of the people said to be responsible for the bombing, there were not, to my knowledge, more than two examples of coverage that treated the resistance as anything but benighted. One was by a New Left figure in Washington, D.C., Mike Tabor; the other, even more detailed, was in the *New Yorker* magazine. In it, Calvin Trilling suggested that seeing the school dispute as simply a know-nothing issue was a serious mistake. It was, he wrote, purely and simply class warfare. One of the leaders, persistently identified in the press as a fundamentalist preacher, was correctly identified by Trilling as a truck driver. The people objecting to the texts were seen by Trilling as people from whom large institutions, such as government, had stripped every vestige of self-respect, leaving them, finally, with only their family structures as supportive—and it was that very structure, as they saw it, that the texts most wanted to destroy.

In retrospect, others have also come to see the situation as considerably complex. Dorothy Nelkin's recent and wonderfully useful book *Science Textbook Controversies and the Politics of Equal Time* (MIT Press) refers to the underdog position from which most school-text protesters view the world. She is also careful to observe that many feel that the schools represent a sort of last ditch of local control and local values, the final place in which an ordinary person can have a say.

Certainly in Kanawha County there was that feeling. The rejection of the texts, although a heady victory for a brief time, has actually done little to change the situation. Citizen panels do have power to review texts, but they still must choose *between* texts presented to them by the experts, rather than having any way to create them. But could they? In four of the southernmost counties of West Virginia there is an interesting suggestion of an answer. There, coal miners are working with local school boards to get books into the schools that deal concretely with the culture and problems of Appalachia, particularly those surrounding its richest natural resource, coal. They have only to look a bit north, to another coal mining area, in Pennsylvania, to see a logical next step. In Northern Cambria High School, in the coal town of Barnesboro, students have produced a fine little book called *Out of the Dark*. It is verbal histories, poems, and drawings about the history of their own community and its mines. I have visited a rural school in Montana where elementary grade kids have done much the same thing. The point is that texts can be built out of local experience—even texts in the sciences can base themselves on local and familiar examples rather than only on abstract ones.

THERE IS A DIGNITY AND A PURpose in such efforts as the one in Barnesboro that badly need to be introduced into this textbook matter lest the unexamined charges of know-nothingism go unchallenged every time a local group challenges national or expert authority.

In *Out of the Dark*, a preface says that the students will continue to produce such books "until they are satisfied that the stories of their remarkable grandfathers and fathers, the stories which are the living seed of their own deep roots, have come out of the dark and have blossomed in the light of knowledge and recognition."

The elite notion that schools must challenge parental authority in order to tear those roots out, and discard them, sees parents as oppressive. That is simply a prejudice. The kids of Barnesboro see the parents as legends and light. That too is a prejudice.

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This brings us back to the root problem: the assumption that public schooling, nationalized education, is the only field on which those questions can be solved.

Letting people have the volitional space to move between or beyond them is freedom.

For a person rigorously interested in science, however, there is at least an added responsibility to walk very carefully in that volitional space. There may often be a temptation to stroll over to the side of the textbook innovators. They are, after all, whooping it up for science, or so they say. Actually, it is possible sometimes to see the supposed fundamentalists as more carefully scientific—in attitude—than the innovators.

In a 1975 textbook controversy at the state level in California, for instance, "fundamentalists" sought some changes in the biology section of a text entitled *Science Framework*.

The original text says, "Science is the total knowledge of facts and principles that govern our lives. . . ."

Now, a more fatheaded, antiscientific bit of twaddle can scarcely be imagined. (If at any time science was total knowledge, we would be facing an infinite stop sign, with no need to think further. Science is, rather, a continuing process of discovering that at no time was our knowledge complete.)

The revised text—from creationists, mind you—says, with scientific good sense, that "science is one way of discovering and interpreting the facts and principles. . . ."

This is scarcely to say that creationists are generally more tolerant than evolutionists, but only to say that in this case they left more doors open. Time was, of course, when they tried to slam those doors tightly by insisting, like evolutionists, that *only* their side be told. For some time now they have takent the actually quite decent position that they simply want equal time.

What of the point, however, that evolution is correct and creationism is false? It is not even a point. The further molecular biology advances, the shakier *all* existing developmental dogma seems. In biology, certainly, one can sense the approach of one of those paradigm-changing times described in Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.

Sometimes the textbook progressives are recorded in the Nelkin study as saying that they do not wish to teach any dogma, including popular and so-called scientific ones. The argument is made plaintive in the context of systems subsidized and guided by state power. The argument is made meretricious by evidence that the only authority that courses such as MACOS want the child to question is parental authority. Grander authority, established and institutional authority, is ironbound, and any course material that even invites discussion of it is so couched as to make the really skeptical student seem, again, a redneck slob.

At one point in the Nelkin study, which is certainly a welcome handbook of cases and quotes, the author asks a series of questions that she seems to feel are virtually without answer:

"The demands of textbook critics for increased participation and the representation of plural interests in science curriculum decisions leaves us with difficult questions: How can one determine if textbook material is anti-religious or in some way biased? What kind of constraints or standards can be imposed to balance academic judgments with local and individual religious or personal concerns? How, in fact, do the personal beliefs and political values of free choice and fairness affect the communication and evaluation of science?"

Those are all questions of control. How does anyone determine, impose, balance, etc.? It brings us back to the root problem: the assumption that public schooling, nationalized education, is the only field on which those questions can be solved. When fundamentalists make that assumption, they scare us silly with visions of a theocracy. When so-called progressives make that assumption, they scare us silly with realization of just what we have—an institutionally dominated orthodoxy.

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INQUIRY

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- *Reviews of* Chinese Shadows, Samuel Johnson, Sensual Drugs
- *Also: Common and uncommon sense about the Soviet Union, by Stephen F. Cohen*

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THE TREATY THAT WALL STREET WROTE

If you think the new Panama Canal Treaty means an end to the Big Stick and Dollar Diplomacy—think again

By Murray N. Rothbard

THE PANAMA CANAL QUESTION HAS already established itself as the hottest political issue for the coming year. Ronald Reagan, who almost rode to the Republican nomination last year on a promise to keep the canal, is back again, leading the powerful forces opposing the new Carter treaties with the government of Panama. Alert to the polls that show Americans overwhelmingly opposed to giving up the canal, the Republican National Committee and most Republicans across the country have gleefully seized upon this issue, thus going flatly against the counsel of former President Ford, who vigorously supports the treaty.

In the liberal and "moderate" press, the contending forces are lined up in an all-too-familiar morality play. Opposed to the treaty are reactionaries and jingoists, emotionally and irrationally devoted to the mystique of American "sovereignty" in a foreign land; in its favor are sensible and moderate internationalists, people who believe in friendly cooperation between the United States and Third World nations, and who wish to jettison the last remnants of a naïve and outdated American imperialism left over from the innocent if clumsy swaggering of Theodore Roosevelt. What could be a more clear-cut moral lineup: for the treaty, all the Good Guys, from Carter to Ford to the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*; against, all the certified Bad Guys from Reagan to the American Conservative Union to the John Birch Society?

BUT YOU CAN'T ALWAYS TELL ALL ABOUT THE game from a list of the players; and there is more to be said than the standard account in the Establishment media.

The Reaganite bluster about sovereignty can easily be dismissed; there is, however, a more important question about the new Panama treaty: Does it really abandon U.S. imperial domination of the canal and the Canal Zone? Does the treaty really turn this area of Panama back to the Panamanians? If we consider the treaty in the light of these questions rather than in relation to jingoist notions, we will come up with a very different view of the big political issue of the year.

Particularly revealing are the statements of high American officials and other advocates in assuring the American public of the fallacy of right-wing fears about the treaty. Thus, Henry Kissinger announced his "strong view" that the treaty "is in the national interest of the United States." Kissinger went on to explain that "the new treaty marks an improvement over the present situation in that it assures continuing, efficient, nondiscriminatory, and secure access to the Panama Canal with the support of the countries of the Western Hemisphere instead of against their opposition and eventually their harassment." (*New York Times*, August 18, 1977.) In short, it is better to stay in more subtly and induce Panama and the rest of the world to support our dominion, than to stay in nakedly and face the hostility of the Panamanians and most other nations.

In his public statement announcing the agreement on the basic elements of the Panama treaty, President Carter stressed that he and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the pact will be "important to our long-term national interests." Specifically, the United States will formally continue in charge of the canal until the year 2000: "We will have operating control and the right to protect and defend the Panama Canal with our military forces until the end of the century." But even after that, "we will have the right to assure the maintenance of the permanent neutrality of the canal as we may determine necessary. Our warships are guaranteed the permanent right to expeditious passage without regard to propulsion or cargo." (*New York Times*, August 13, 1977.) Or, as the Carter administration's summary of the Panama agreement put it: "The U.S. will have the permanent right to defend the neutrality of the canal from any threat, for an indefinite period." President Carter himself has stated flatly, "If it is attacked by any means, I will defend it." He has assured the public that "if we ever have to go into Panama, there will be no legal question under these treaties." (*Los Angeles Times*, October 23, 1977.) In short, there are no limits in this treaty on the actions that the United States will be able to take, even after the year 2000, to preserve what it deems to be the "neutrality" of the canal.[1]

Thus, in exchange for the mystique of sovereignty and formal national ownership, the United States has acquired the agreement of the Panamanian government in its perpetual ultimate control of the canal. Or, as Ellsworth Bunker, one of the two American negotiators of the treaty—the other was Sol Linowitz—admonished the critics: "It is not ownership but use that is important." He could have added the fact that ability to use and control property is precisely the function of ownership.[2]

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1. *For a confirming view, see the report on the broadcast by Sol Linowitz over the Voice of America, in Harry B. Ellis, "Carter Still Presses for Canal Treaty,"* Christian Science Monitor, *August 31, 1977.*

2. *Actually, it is unclear that even our existing status in Panama is one of sovereignty and ownership over the Canal Zone. The 1903 treaty with Panama merely grants to the United States "in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of a zone. . . ." The Supreme Court of the Canal Zone on May 6, 1907, in the case of Canal Zone* v. *Coulson, ruled, quite in the spirit of the treaty, that "the United States is not owner in fee of the Canal Zone; it has only the use and occupation as long as it complies with the terms of the treaty." It is true, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court chose to disregard such limits in the same year, asserting that "the title of the United States to the Canal Zone is not imperfect. . . ." (Wilson* v. *Shaw.)*

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WHEN THE NEW TREATY WAS announced, Bunker and Linowitz spelled out one of its major advantages to U.S. dominion. As the August 13 *New York Times* phrased it, Bunker and Linowitz "said they thought that continued operation of the canal was threatened more by possible Panamanian sabotage or disorders that might follow a failure to carry out the agreement than by external threats that they asserted the United States would be free to curb."

But particularly fascinating is the argument on behalf of the Panama treaty by the most sophisticated of American conservative organs, *National Review*. *National Review* begins its editorial by assuaging the hurt to the "national pride" of conservatives, and assuring their conservative followers that it understands their "soul-searing" pain. Then, *NR* proceeds to instruct its constituency in the realities of today's world. "Conservatives are realists, and here is a test of realism." Specifically, and echoing Kissinger, Linowitz, and Bunker, *NR* points out that "our own military men support the treaty on the ground that the canal can be better defended with the treaty than without it." First of all, under the new treaty Panama agrees that the United States may continue to use its air and sea forces to defend the Panama Canal against an external attack. *NR* then turns to the "most realistic kind" of military threat to U.S. rule over the canal, namely "guerrilla warfare, and defense against that is very difficult under any circumstances." And then *NR* adds the clincher: "One thing is sure—it could be done far better together with Panama than without it; or worse, against it." In short, the Panamanian government would now be ranged against such guerrilla warfare rather than overtly or covertly supporting it.

Addressing a common fear of the treaty critics, *NR* supposes that Panama violates the treaty. In that case, the magazine concludes, "we will still be in a position to act if and when necessary. And what is most important, we would almost surely be in a stronger position to act at some later time in response to an actual threat or violation of the treaty than we would be now in defense of our own refusal to ratify." ("The Proposed Treaty: Preliminary Thoughts," *National Review*, September 2, 1977.) In other words, far better for the United States to exercise its power in defense of a treaty—and therefore in command of wide international support—than in isolation after refusing to ratify.

In a similar vain, Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, told a White House meeting of prominent Georgians and Floridians that "if he were in the Kremlin and he could think of anything that . . . might alienate countries against the United States even further, it would be defeat of these treaties." (Don Irwin, "Rusk Sees Chance of War in Panama," *Los Angeles Times*, August 31, 1977.)

A COMMON CONSERVATIVE CHARGE IS that the treaty will hand over the canal to a "Communist" Torrijos regime in Panama. Far from being a "Communist," however, General Torrijos is in hot water in his own country, especially among the antiimperialist critics on the Left.[3]

Panamanian newspapers were highly reluctant to reveal to their readers the details of the agreement with the United States. The *New York Times* reported that "rather than expressing joy at the culmination of the long negotiations, most Panamanians appeared today to be uncertain and confused. . . ." Addressing a meeting of the Panamanian Student Federation, that country's chief negotiator of the agreement, Dr. Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, admitted that many aspects of the treaty were "bad" and even "ugly"; in defense, Escobar demagogically posed the only alternative to the treaty as a "confrontation" with the United States and the "massacre of the best of our youth."

The Panama government announced its intention to hold an early national plebiscite to decide on ratification of the treaty, but it is clear that the plebiscite, which endorsed the treaty by 2 to 1, was held in the midst of a propaganda campaign branding any criticism of the treaty as "treason against our fatherland." More important, it was held while many of the leading opponents of the treaty were languishing in exile. For, over the past three years, the Torrijos regime has systematically deported its most outspoken critics, including likely opponents of the new treaty, to Miami, Mexico, and Venezuela. (*New York Times*, August 11.)

Indeed, one of the major unsuccessful demands of the Panamanian Left was that Torrijos keep his promise to declare a general amnesty for political prisoners, and that he allow all the exiles to return to Panama and challenge the treaty. In the light of this situation, it must be considered a joke in questionable taste for Dr. Escobar to condemn the Panamanian exiles in Miami for urging U.S. senators to vote against the treaty. Obviously, a simple way for Panama to put a stop to this activity would be to allow the exiles to return to their Panamanian homeland.

Moreover, a full and fair debate over the plebiscite was precluded by the Torrijos regime's iron control of the media. Every one of the newspapers and television stations is owned or controlled by the government, and the radio stations are also effectively ruled by the regime.

Press censorship and restrictions on public assembly were officially lifted during the 40 days prior to the plebiscite, but Torrijos refused to grant any additional time for public debate. As Marlise Simons reported in the *Washington Post* of October13, "Officials say that Panamanians know enough about the treaties and only troublemakers want more time."

Mounting criticism of the treaty has come from conservative as well as leftist critics of the Torrijos regime. The conservative Movement of Independent Lawyers of Panama has denounced the treaty for approving the "first American intervention in our country of the twenty-first century." The MILP went on to assert that "the ordinary Panamanian will easily understand that . . . there will be a new version—perhaps slightly less grotesque than before—of the hated American perpetuity on the canal issue. Both the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties also came out against the treaties, "pointing out that in 1926 and again in 1947, Panama had rejected drafts attempting to legalize the U.S. military bases [there]." (*Washington Post*, October 13.) And Panama's Trotskyist Revolutionary Socialist League made the significant statement that the present would be a particularly auspicious time to confront American imperialism: "Today we have the eyes of the world on us, today we have international support, today imperialism has been weakened by Watergate and Vietnam." (*New York Times*, August 11.)

On September 6, the Panamanian Left made known its displeasure with the treaty; 1500 students demonstrated in Panama City against the "dirty treaty" and its provisions for maintaining American military bases and perpetual rights of American intervention. The protest was stamped out by Torrijos's National Guard, which injured dozens of demonstrators and arrested over 30 students.

IF THE PANAMA TREATIES MERELY PROVIDE A SOphisticated fig-leaf for continued American domination of the canal, why then did the Torrijos regime sign the accord, in face of the domestic troubles that would predictably ensue? One answer to this question might be that venerable motive, money—a vital aspect of the treaty is U.S. agreement to sugarcoat the pill by multiplying manyfold the annual revenues going into the coffers of the Panamanian treasury. Currently, the U.S. government pays $2.3 million a year to Panama for use of the canal. The treaty proposes to increase this amount by giving Panama $0.30 per ton out of the current canal toll of $1.29 per ton. With corrections for inflation, this share is expected to amount to a revenue of $40–$50 million per year. In addition, operational revenues will be paid for such services as ship repair and dockage; this is expected to amount to $20 million per year.

But this is far from all. The United States also pledges to under-

3. *The other major charge by the Right is that Torrijos is a "dictator." This is true enough, but the charge comes with peculiar ill-grace from a movement that has expressed its devoted admiration for every dictatorial and fascist regime in the world, from South Africa to Chile, South Korea, and the Philippines.*

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take a five-year program of supplying financial goodies to Panama: $200 million of Export-Import Bank credits; $75 million in Agency for International Development housing credits; and $20 million in loan guarantees from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. This amounts to a five-year boodle of nearly $300 million, which, added to $70 million per annum, makes a handsome subsidy package, and perhaps worth the risk of a few student demonstrations.

Apparently, the Carter administration feels that it can sell this package to the American public with the argument that none of this money will come directly out of taxes; the annual sum will initally come out of the toll revenues of the U.S.-government-owned Panama Canal Company, and later out of the budget of the new, frankly governmental American agency which is scheduled to replace the Panama Canal Company in running the canal. The five-year plan, too, consists of loans and loan guarantees. While all this is ultimately guaranteed by the U.S. taxpayer, the subsidy package, being long-run and indirect, might be slipped by the American taxpayer without causing an outcry.

FOCUSING ON THE MONEY ENABLES US TO PONder the seemingly curious phenomenon that American big business, unlike our conservative ideologues, is overwhelmingly in favor of the Panama treaty. The advocates include such influential business leaders as Irving S. Shapiro of du Pont, head of the Business Roundtable, and such groups as the National Association of Manufacturers. One general reason for this support is that these sophisticated business groups understand and welcome the treaty as a more subtle and acceptable form of American imperialism. A more specific reason is the effect the treaty will have for those firms with trade and investment in Latin America. Rejection of the treaty might mean anti-U.S. unrest throughout the region and might have a "destabilizing" effect on American investments there. Private U.S. investment in Latin America is estimated at $24 billion, while total two-way U.S. trade there amounted to $34 billion in 1976. As John M. Goshko reported in the August 22 *Washington Post*:

"These economic factors could produce some startling surprises about where different interest groups line up in the battle.

"There is the strong likelihood that the normally conservative, Republican-leaning business establishment will be solidly on the side of a Democratic president. . . .

"Where the business community is concerned, Carter administration strategists contend, the case for supporting the treaties seems ironclad. In fact, the administration privately is counting on big business to provide some potentially crucial help in getting the treaties past the hurdle of Senate ratification."

Leaders of big business, unlike our conservative ideologues, largely favor the treaties. Sophisticated business groups understand and welcome the treaty as a more subtle and acceptable form of American imperialism.

Already, Henry R. Geyelin, president of the Council of the Americas, a nonprofit business association comprising every major U.S. firm doing business in Latin America, has testified in behalf of such a treaty before the House Panama Canal Subcommittee.

But explanations in terms of groups or classes are never as rewarding as the concrete unveiling of specific monetary interests. Thus, there needs to be further investigation of which U.S. business or financial groups might be benefiting specifically from the hundreds of millions of dollars that the U.S. government will be pouring into Panama. One clear group of beneficiaries is the American exporters who will receive orders from the $300-million package. U.S. foreign aid is a clever mechanism by which American tax-



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payers and the U.S. government subsidize American export firms: The dollars are extracted from the taxpayer and are then funneled by the U.S. government to the foreign recipients, who in turn spend the dollars on American exporters. In this case the process is clear: The Panama treaty explicitly applies "Buy American" provisions to the aid, making sure that the American exporters receive the dollars as rapidly as possible.

But there is another use that the Panamanian government will have for the U.S. aid, one that may prove to be a more intimate lead to the underlying reason for concluding this treaty. Panama is heavily in debt to U.S. banks, and the influx of hundreds of millions of dollars will certainly ease its burden in paying the interest and principal on the debt; it may even save Panama from bankruptcy—and the American banks from severe embarrassment. We must therefore contemplate the possibility that the nub of the Panama treaty is a covert bail-out operation, by which the American taxpayer is being gulled into subsidizing, and even salvaging, a handful of U.S. banks.

THIS SUGGESTION DOES NOT SEEM VERY outrageous if we consider the history of how the United States got involved with the Panama Canal in the first place. It's not just, as Senator Hayakawa (R.-Cal.) said, that "we stole it [the canal] fair and square." Or that President Theodore Roosevelt engineered a phony "revolution" in 1903, by which employees of the American-owned railroad declared the Panama section of Colombia independent and American ships prevented Colombia from putting down the rebellion. The similarity with the present theme comes from the hidden motive behind Teddy Roosevelt's flamboyant actions.

In order to build the canal, the United States felt that it had to purchase the right to do so from the bankrupt French-owned company that had failed in its attempt to dig the canal. Teddy Roosevelt explained that he acted out of indignation at the Colombian government's insisting on a $10-million "holdup" of American taxpayers for the right to build a canal in Panama. Actually, the U.S. government was perfectly willing to pay $40 million to the French Panama Canal Company. The $10 million to Colombia would have come, not from the taxpayers, but out of the $40-million cut going to the French company.

Why, then, did Teddy Roosevelt swing the big stick and foment a phony revolution in Colombia, in order to save $10 million for the coffers of a bankrupt French-owned company? The answer, which came out years later, is that the "French" company was French no longer; its shares had been secretly bought up shortly before by a syndicate of Wall Street bankers, headed by J. P. Morgan and Company. The syndicate hired the eminent Wall Street lawyer, William Nelson Cromwell, to get the American money, and it was Cromwell, sitting in the White House itself, who wrote TR's dispatches and orders, and engineered the entire operation. After the syndicate got the $40 million, they were able to sell their shares to the U.S. government for twice what they had paid.

Moreover, one of the syndicate members was none other than Teddy Roosevelt's brother-in-law, Douglas E. Robinson. Not only did Robinson benefit as a syndicate member, but most of the $40 million from the U.S. taxpayers was funneled by Cromwell into the New York real estate firm of the same Douglas Robinson.

And so we should not be surprised to discover that U.S. government action in Panama today is for the purpose of subsidizing the Wall Street bankers. Judging from the facts available to us, the current treaty may well be a rerun of the original bail-out.

Commercial banks refuse to make public the details of specific loans, like those to Panama, and the Panamanian government is not exactly generous with such information, either. However, some broad information is available. When General Torrijos seized power in the 1968 coup, Panama's national debt abroad was $167 million; its estimated total current debt is more than $3.5 billion. More pertinently, the total debt of the Panama government to U.S.

We must contemplate the possibility that the nub of the Panama treaty is a bail-out operation, by which the American taxpayer is being gulled into subsidizing, and even salvaging, a handful of U.S. banks.

banks is reported by the Library of Congress at $1.7 billion. In a memorandum to the president of Panama, the Department of Planning stated that no less than 39 percent of Panama's budget is being used to service its foreign debt, which amounts to $42 million per year and includes $25 million in interest and $17 million in amortizing principal.

Leading the parade of American banks involved in Panama are the First National City Bank and the Chase Manhattan Bank, the flagship bank for the far-flung Rockefeller financial interests. Both of these banks serve as fiscal agents for the government of Panama. In one advertisement for a $115-million loan to Panama, for example, the First National City Bank is listed as the agent for the loan. Other participating banks included the Bank of America, Bankers Trust, Chase Manhattan, the First National Bank of Boston, the First National Bank of Chicago, the Republic National Bank of Dallas, and the Marine Midland Bank.

We might well ask, Why did the New York banks pour all these loans into Torrijos' Panama? It seems clear that the money was a *quid pro quo* for Torrijos' decision—on the advice of leading New York banks—to reorganize Panama's banking laws in July 1970. This reorganization provided a favorable haven, free of taxes and

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WHO'S WHO FOR THE CANAL TREATY

On November 1, the New York Times carried a large advertisement paid for by a group called the Committee of Americans for the Canal Treaty, Inc. The following is a partial list of the 200 prominent Americans whose names appeared as members of the Committee, along with pertinent associations:

STEPHEN AILES—lawyer; director of Riggs National Bank

HOYT AMMIDON—U.S. Trust Co.

ROBERT O. ANDERSON—Atlantic Richfield Co.

GEORGE W. BALL—investment banker; Lehman Bros.

ROBERT S. BENJAMIN—lawyer; director of Transamerica Corp.

EUGENE BLACK—former president of the World Bank

SHIRLEY TEMPLE BLACK—former Ambassador to Ghana; director of Del Monte Corp.

WILLIAM MCC. BLAIR, JR.—investment banker, William Blair Co.

WILLIAM BOESCHENSTEIN—Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.

EDGAR BRONFMAN—Distillers Corp.—Seagrams Ltd.

JOHN W. BROOKS—Celanese Corp.

PHILLIP BUCHEN—counsel to President Ford

HENRY CATTO, JR.—former U.S. Chief of Protocol

GARDNER COWLES—Cowles Communications, Inc.

J. DEWEY DAANE—Commerce Union Bank

RICHARD DEBS—Federal Reserve Bank of New York

C. DOUGLAS DILLON—Rockefeller Foundation; director, Dillon, Read & Co.; Secretary of the Treasury for Kennedy and Johnson (1961–1965)

THOMAS K. FINLETTER—former Secretary of the Air Force

MAX FISHER—Manufacturer's National Bank of Detroit

PETER FLANAGAN—investment banker, Dillon, Read & Co.

MICHAEL V. FORRESTAL—Wall Street lawyer; formerly on White House National Security Staff

HENRY H. FOWLER—investment banker, Goldman, Sachs & Co.; former Secretary of the Treasury

J. WAYNE FREDERICKS—Ford Motor Co.

ORVILLE FREEMAN—Business International Corp.; former Secretary of Agriculture

RICHARD M. FURLAUD—Squibb Corp.; American Express Co.; Chase Manhattan Bank

W. L. HADLEY GRIFFIN—Brown Shoe Co.

ARMAND HAMMER—Occidental Petroleum Corp.

W. AVERELL HARRIMAN—Brown Bros., Harriman & Co.; former presidental adviser, Ambassador, Secretary of Commerce, and Governor of New York

BEN HEINEMAN—First National Bank of Chicago

ANDREW HEISKELL—chairman of the board, Time, Inc.

ROBERT H. KNIGHT—Wall Street lawyer; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

ARTHUR KRIM—United Artists Corp.

R. HEATH LARRY—U.S. Steel

HARDING W. LAWRENCE—Braniff Airways

HENRY CABOT LODGE—former U.S. Ambassador to UN

JOHN LOEB—investment banker, Loeb, Rhodes & Co.

PETER LOEB—investment banker, Loeb, Rhodes & Co.

JOHN H. MCCLOY—Wall Street lawyer; former chairman of the board, Chase Manhattan Bank

C. PETER MCCOLOUGH—Xerox

GEORGE MEANY—president, AFL-CIO

G. WILLIAM MILLER—Textron

J. IRWIN MILLER—Cummins Engine Co.

PAUL NITZE—former Deputy Secretary of Defense

GENERAL LAURIS NORSTAD—former Commander of SHAPE

JANE CAHILL PFEIFFER—IBM

PETER G. PETERSON—investment banker, Lehman Bros.; former Secretary of the Treasury

DAVID REYNOLDS—Reynolds Metals Co.

GENERAL MATTHEW RIDGWAY—former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

DAVID ROCKEFELLER—Chase Manhattan Bank

NELSON ROCKEFELLER

ROBERT ROOSA—Brown Bros., Harriman & Co.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, JR.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT IV—investment banker, Lehman Bros.

WALT WHITMAN ROSTOW—former national security assistant to President Johnson

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.—former special assistant to President Kennedy

BENNO SCHMIDT—J. H. Whitney & Co.

IRVING SHAPIRO—du Pont; director, First National City Bank

GEORGE P. SHULTZ—Bechtel Corp.; director, Inter-American Development Bank; former Secretary of the Treasury

ARTHUR TAYLOR—CBS

GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR—former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

WALTER THAYER—Whitney Communications Corp.

ALEXANDER TROWBRIDGE—Allied Chemicals Corp.; former Secretary of Commerce

LEW WASSERMAN—MCA, Inc.

JAMES WILCOCK—Mellon Bank

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onerous regulations, for foreign banks in Panama, much as Panama has long provided a flag of convenience for world shipping. Since the 1970 legal change, total banking assets in Panama have expanded enormously from a few banks with a few million dollars to 73 banks with total assets of $8.6 billion, conducting transactions throughout the world. Prominent among the U.S. banks expanding rapidly in Panama since the 1970 legislation are the First National City Bank, the Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, and the Marine Midland Bank.

It was a deal that benefited the U.S. banks and the Torrijos regime, which could thereby expand its wealth as well as its political power in Panama. But now the U.S. taxpayer is being subtly asked to pick up the tab.

IF A HANDFUL OF LARGE U.S. BANKS WILL BE THE major beneficiaries of the Panama Canal treaty, have they also had any role in lobbying for or negotiating the treaty itself? Or will their gains be merely a lucky windfall from decisions made by the U.S. government for very different reasons? Let us see. While the treaty was being negotiated, then-Senator Gale McGee (D.-Wyo.), one of the leading protreaty people in Congress, held a meeting at the State Department at the end of October 1975 to organize a protreaty lobby. In attendance were lobbyists for the Chase Manhattan Bank, the Bank of America, such large corporations as Gulf Oil and Rockwell International, as well as representatives of the Council of the Americas. A campaign kitty was raised at that meeting, estimates of the size ranging from $100,000 to $500,000. Subsequent meetings brought in lobbyists for other large banks and corporations, including Pan American World Airways. Plans were made at these meetings to pressure the U.S. Chamber of Commerce into supporting the future treaty. (See Russell W. Howe and Sarah H. Trott, *The Power Peddlers*, Doubleday, p.123.)

The influence of the bankers and the corporations, however, has been even more direct. When Carter took office he appointed the dynamic and highly influential Sol Linowitz, former ambassador to the Organization of American States and long an advocate of a new treaty, to join the octogenarian Ellsworth Bunker on the Panama Canal negotiating team. Bunker himself is a former director of Bankers Trust, and his brother, Arthur Hugh Bunker, is a longtime director of Lehman Brothers.

Linowitz's connections are more numerous and impressive. He is a member of the powerful Council on Foreign Relations, which is dominated as well as chaired by David Rockefeller, who is also chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank. Moreover, Linowitz is a member of the exclusive and now-famous Trilateral Commission, which was founded and is dominated by David Rockefeller and which includes so many foreign-policy and economic-affairs leaders of the Carter administration—from Carter himself to Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and National Security Adviser Brzezinski. In addition, Linowitz is a trustee and former chairman of the policy committee of the Center for Inter-American Relations, an organization founded and chaired by David Rockefeller, whose directors interlock heavily with the Council for Foreign Relations. Linowitz was also a member of Nelson Rockefeller's personal vehicle for his abortive presidential run, the National Committee on Critical Choices for Americans. As a member of the board of directors of Time, Inc., Linowitz also wields a degree of influence on the media.

Even more pertinently, upon his appointment as negotiator of the canal treaties, Sol Linowitz was a member of the board and the executive committee of Marine Midland Bank and of Pan Am. He was also a large stockholder in Marine Midland. The Marine Midland connection is clear and direct; for, as Congressman George Hansen (R.-Idaho) has disclosed, the government of Panama owes Marine Midland Bank nearly $8 million. Furthermore, it was only after Hansen and Senator James McClure (R.-Idaho) filed suit on April 20 for a temporary restraining order against Linowitz as canal negotiator, that Linowitz finally resigned his positions with Marine Midland. The suit sought the restraining order on the ground of conflict of interest on the part of Linowitz, at least until this presidential appointment should be confirmed by the Senate.

Linowitz, however, insisted on keeping his high positions at Pan Am while negotiating and arguing on behalf of the canal treaty. Pan Am's connection, while intriguing, does not seem as direct as Marine Midland's. Pan Am has for decades been within the Rockefeller financial ambit, as is indicated by James S. Rockefeller's presence on the airline's board of directors. Other directors are Frank Stanton of CBS and Donald Kendall of Pepsico, both of whom are directors at Atlantic Richfield Company, whose president, Robert O. Anderson, is a member of the board of Rockefeller's

Why did the New York banks pour all these loans into Panama? The money was a quid pro quo for Torrijos's decision—on the advice of leading New York banks—to recognize Panama's banking laws in July 1970.

Chase Manhattan Bank. Until he became secretary of state, Cyrus Vance was also a director of Pan Am. While too much should not be made of a list of corporate interconnections, the above establishes a clear pattern of Linowitz-Rockefeller commonality of interest and action.

We have already seen that Pan Am particpated in the McGee-organized corporate lobbying in favor of a Panama treaty. What does Pan Am have to gain from Torrijos? One obvious benefit is the protection of the company's landing rights in Panama. It just might be important that Panama serves as Pan Am's headquarters for Latin America.

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT INFLUences in the drive toward a treaty was the new Washington-based Commission on U.S.-Latin American Relations. The commission was organized in 1974 by the Center for Inter-American Relations and was largely financed by Ford Foundation and Rockefeller funds. Its chairman until recently was Sol Linowitz, with Dr. Robert A. Pastor serving as the staff director. Other members of the Linowitz Commission included such influential Trilateral Commission members as W. Michael Blumenthal, who is now secretary of the treasury; Samuel P. Huntington, now an aide to the National Security Council; Peter Peterson, chairman of Lehman Brothers; and Elliott Richardson.

In December 1976, Pastor wrote a report for the Linowitz Commission, urging a new treaty and substantial funds for Panama; the Council on Foreign Relations promptly held a special colloquium on the subject and endorsed the Linowitz Report. The next month, Brzezinski, national security adviser to Carter, appointed a special assistant on the Panama question, who turned out to be none other than Dr. Robert Pastor.

Without delay, Pastor drew up a National Security Council memorandum recommending a new Panama Canal treaty. The paper was approved by Brzezinski, and then, after checking with longtime Nelson Rockefeller foreign policy aide Henry Kissinger, endorsed by Carter. As the culmination of the Linowitz-Rockefeller drive, Linowitz then got himself appointed negotiator for the new Panama treaty.

There are several ironies that emerge from a careful look at the Panama Canal treaty fight—especially the picture of this country's liberals and progressives battling to pour money into the coffers of a handful of Wall Street banks in the name of a treaty they mistakenly believe represents a withdrawal of U.S. power abroad. It doesn't, and those who automatically oppose anything the right wing favors, need to do some hard rethinking of their reflexive support for the new Panama Canal treaties.

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

THE WAY OUT OF KOREA

A genuine alternative to the Nixon-Carter Doctrine in Asia

By Earl C. Ravenal

PRESIDENT CARTER'S plan to remove the bulk of American ground forces from South Korea by 1982 is not really a disengagement; it is, rather, an attempt at more aseptic involvement. It is not a political or military departure, in any sense of the word, but rather a realization of the Nixon Doctrine. The three squadrons of American F-4 fighter-bombers (of 18 to 25 planes each) will remain in the country indefinitely. Powerful American naval deployments in regional waters, forward-based at Yokosuka and Sasebo in Japan, will be available for quick reaction. Even the putative withdrawal schedule has been modified, in response to South Korean fears, to allow most of the American ground combat forces—two brigades of the 2d Infantry Division with 8000 men, and another 4000 support troops—to stay to the last, until 1982. At the end, a residual American force of 8000 air force personnel and 6000 logistics specialists will remain.

Thus, the withdrawal plan itself, now stretched out and "rear-end loaded," is contingent on strategic developments in the region and on political currents at home, and not nearly as unconditional as it once seemed. Moreover, there are no plans to demobilize the departing American forces, approximately 30,000 men. Specifically, the 2d Infantry Division is earmarked as a rapid reaction force in the Pacific, to reintervene in such countries as Korea, if they were to be attacked. "It probably makes sense to continue approximately our current deployments in the Western Pacific, and with them, our ability to react swiftly to any aggressive moves by North Korea," Secretary of Defense Harold Brown told Congress in February. Thus, Carter's plan will not even produce savings from the more than $5 billion of our defense budget currently attributable to the defense of Korea. (Indeed, the more remote reintervention capability will probably cost more.)

Partial and uncertain as it is, the withdrawal must be bought at a cost of more than $2 billion of additional arms transfers. Congress will be asked to approve a package of modern equipment for South Korea, to consist of credits, over five years, of nearly $1.4 billion, and a legacy of more than $800 million of the 2d Division's helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and possibly tanks and nuclear-capable "Honest John" rockets. The package will probably also include hundreds of modern jet fighters, among them the new F-16, and half a dozen naval destroyers. When our government agrees to a five-year dose of Korean modernization in exchange for a five-year reduction of our troop presence, we should realize that this is precisely what we have *already done*: The five-year plan that ended in 1975 cost more than $1.5 billion in addition to "regular" military assistance. *That* was supposed to be the "golden handshake." By now, South Korea was supposed to be militarily self-sufficient on the peninsula, and American troops were supposed to be out.

OPERATING here is the incalculable principle of "compensation," rather than the principle of strategic requirements, which is sometimes inconclusive but at least definable. In the case of Korea, "compensation" seems to have been adopted even by liberal centers of strategic analysis, as this statement by the head of the Brookings Institution defense analysis staff shows: "Other steps should be taken to ameliorate the political consequences of the withdrawals; to avoid giving the false impression that these reductions implied an end to U.S. defense commitments in Northeast Asia. Consultations with concerned governments, strong public reaffirmation of commitments, accelerated arms transfers to South Korea and Japan, and military exercises designed to show the U.S. ability to return to the peninsula in force, should that become necessary, would all be helpful in avoiding adverse consequences."

All this makes us wonder why we should bother to initiate a withdrawal in the first place. The compensations might be worse than the situation we originally faced.

This is especially true when we consider the political assurances that have been exacted to counterbalance a removal of some

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tangible elements of force. At every step in the negotiations and consultations with South Korea and Japan surrounding the troop withdrawal from Korea, the Carter administration has had to issue intensive and fervent reaffirmations of our security commitment to Korea.

The joint Korean-American communiqué of July 26, 1977, emphasized, predictably, that the American treaty commitment of 1953 to defend Korea remained unchanged. To underscore this, a joint command was formed to develop plans for the reintervention of American forces.

"We're not pulling out of this place," U.S. Ambassador Richard Sneider has reassured the Koreans. "The pullout from Korea is just a restructuring of forces and not a change of commitment in Northeast Asia," Secretary Brown has repeated. One is compelled—on the level of intention, not necessarily future performance—to give credence to these statements.

Thus, the Carter plan is a slow, partial, and possibly conditional withdrawal that continues our defense commitment to South Korea. In the style of the Nixon Doctrine, it promises perpetual involvement but invites recriminations by allies. It is the typical middle position, with all the obvious contradictions of that position and with few earmarks of definitive choice.



"The pullout from Korea is just a restructuring of forces and not a change of commitment."
—Secretary Harold Brown

THERE IS A GENUINE and consistent alternative to the present U.S. policy in Korea and to the conservative, status quo position of many in Congress. Unlike these proposals, it addresses the hard questions of when, how, and how unconditionally the United States will withdraw its forces, and what residual commitments, if any, the United States will have in the area.

As an alternative to the Carter plan, I suggest that the United States over a period of two—or at the most three—years should remove from Korea all its ground forces, air units, and tactical nuclear weapons. Any package of arms to be given or sold on credit to South Korea as compensation for this withdrawal should be scrutinized rigorously and limited to a few critical items and to bare political necessity. Moreover, this withdrawal should not be made conditional on internal political changes in South Korea, progress toward North-South accommodation, or an increased Japanese role on the peninsula. Finally, we should not only withdraw our forces from Korea, but also eliminate those units from our force structure and dissolve our security commitment to South Korea.

The removal of ground forces should be carried out proportionally, not leaving most of the effective combat units to the end and thus inviting the curtailment of the plan through domestic political maneuvering within the United States. The move should be a serious strategic one, not just a signal or a bargaining chip to elicit certain peaceful behavior from North Korea, or cooperative moves from China or the Soviet Union, or internal political reform from the government of South Korea. Therefore, the move should be irreversible and complete. There should be no residual force, of a combat or a logistical nature, at the end of the process.

This applies to American air units, too; though in this category, alone among all the categories of arms transfer, we might make available to South Korean purchase a few squadrons of modern fighter-bombers, to redress their disadvantage in air superiority and close air support. The aircraft we transfer should be limited to defensive capabilities—though modern equipment and tactics are not absolutely subject to such discrimination.

As we withdraw, we should eliminate from our force structure all units committed to, or primarily oriented to, the defense of Korea. This proposal has two components: The first is obvious—we should disband those units that are withdrawn from Korea. That, of course, is not the present plan of the Carter administration. Representative Lester Wolff, chairman of the House International Relations Committee subcommittee that held hearings on the withdrawal from Korea, stated that "demobilization of the [2d Infantry] division would save U.S. taxpayers some $900 million yearly . . . [while] on the other hand . . . reassignment of the division within the United States would cost an extra $150 million in the next five years, mostly in construction to house the unit."

In my estimation, both of these figures are understated.

The simple retention of one army division in our force structure costs about $1.8 billion a year, if we include its share of its own Service's overhead (further inclusion of general Department of Defense overhead would raise this figure to well over $2 billion a year). And base construction costs are traditionally subject to large overruns. But the continued commitment of one ground division to a Korean contingency is just the tip of the iceberg.

The ground division and all the concomitant air, naval, and logistical units that we keep in our force structure for a Korean contingency, with their "full slice" of Department of Defense overhead, and the "regular" military assistance we have been giving to South Korea, come to a total of $5.2 billion a year. And even this is not the whole story.

OUR INVOLVE- ment in Korea dominates our force planning for the entire Pacific. Korea is the case that "requires" us to maintain in our baseline force structure enough tactical air power for about 1000 sorties a day—perhaps as much as seven or eight air wings, either land- or sea-based, at an aggregate annual cost of $4.5 to $5.5 billion. Korea also "requires" several ground divisions (though here the planning is not precise), the maintenance of bases in Japan, Okinawa, and Korea itself, and a significant airlift capability, as well as military assistance for the modernization of the Korean army, and a large tactical nuclear inventory for a "worst case" such as the unexpected initial defeat of South Korea or the intervention of one of North Korea's large protectors. All told, we are spending "for" Korea as much as $12 or $13 billion a year, out of the $25 billion of the general purpose force budget that we devote to "Asia." If we were to eliminate, not just our "presence" in Korea, but our commitment to its defense, we might save this larger figure of $12 to $13 billion a year. Budget savings are not, of course, a *sufficient* reason for curtailing commitments. But they can furnish an interesting contributory motive.

In addition to troop reductions, we should remove all tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, we should not plan to reintroduce them, under any circumstances or for any purpose, whether for actual use or for their often-proposed value as a "signal" of our resolve or an escalatory notch on the stick of crisis bargaining. Certainly, we should not threaten their possible contingent use in

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order to compensate for a reduction in our troop presence, or—as did then-Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger—to discourage Kim Il Sung's adventurism and calm Park Chung Hee's tremors in the wake of the fall of Vietnam in 1975.

As we pull out, we should confine any compensation to South Korea to the minimum that might be *politically* necessary to secure the withdrawal. Very little of the $2-billion-plus arms transfer package proposed by the Carter administration is *militarily* necessary. As I described above, we have already gone through this exercise, from 1971 to 1975. The trouble occurred in the late summer of 1971, when further troop reductions, beyond the initial 20,000 that had been approved by President Nixon, were debated in the National Security Council. According to reports, a stringent proposal from the Defense Department was blocked by the State Department and by Henry Kissinger, the assistant for national security. So we lost our first opportunity to ransom all our forces in Korea—or perhaps just all our ground troops—with the first Korean modernization package of $1.5 billion. Certainly we do not need, now, to extend *another* lavish modernization plan in return for South Korea's approval of the slow and incomplete withdrawal of our present force.

Nor should we heed those critics who would hinge the execution, or the pace, of our withdrawal to the internal political practices of the Park government. Such a hinge can bend in both directions. If Park—or a successor—were to make cosmetic, or even real, improvements, our forces might be in South Korea forever. American troop deployments should not be considered a reward for palatable political behavior.

The United States should "allow" both Koreas to develop their own future relationship at their own pace and in their own style—and with the appropriate consequences. We might bless the formula of two independent states in one "nation," if that is what both Koreas finally arrive at; but we should not invest our prestige in this or any other solution, interim or final.

IN 1972, THE SITUATION IN Korea, long frozen, began to present some opportunities, at least in the limited sense of allowing the United States to disengage with minimum responsibility and pain. There were initiatives by both South and North Korea, quite unexpected in their timing, relative generosity, and scope, in the area of peaceful reunification through a series of smalls steps, such as the establishment of communications between, and reunion of, separated families, and in the area of arms reductions and the renunciation of force. The United States would not lose much by encouraging the renewal of this process of accommodation, whether it succeeded or failed; and we might even gain some modest diplomatic leverage, to make up for our loss of military influence, by making discreet contacts with the North. But we should not further burden the prospect of American troop withdrawal by "mak[ing] the completion of U.S. withdrawal *conditional* upon progress toward a North-South accommodation"—the insistent suggestion of Professor Donald Zagoria of Hunter College—and it does not improve the discussion for this professor to label "Settl[ing] for anything less" as "irresponsible."

In this connection the United States could accept, not obstruct, the North Korean initiative to place the Korea issue on the UN calendar for debate of the essential point: withdrawal of "UN" (American) forces. This is not necessarily a zero-sum proposition, with North Korea's gain as our loss. We might even benefit, marginally, by dissolving the American presence in Korea under the aegis of the United Nations. And by exerting energy to keep issues such as this off the agenda, we use up diplomatic capital, occasionally antagonize friendly governments, and discredit our reputation for perceptiveness and reason.

The United States should neither compensate for its withdrawal by encouraging Japan's surrogate political-military presence in Korea nor, conversely, make the *avoidance* of Japan's larger and more independent diplomacy a reason for keeping our own forces in Korea. In particular, the United States should not push Japan to assume more "burden sharing," or a "larger regional role" in Asia, especially one that involves increased defense budgets, offensive forces, wider-ranging naval patrols, or nuclear weapons (such trial balloons as then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's 1971 prodding of Japanese nuclear armament were particularly unconstructive). Japan may well pursue a more active foreign policy, but the United States should not identify with it, let alone instigate it.

On the other hand, we need not grant Japan, in effect, a veto on the fact or the extent of our withdrawal from Korea. There should be ample consultations, and frank discussions of our military calculations and the rationale and timetable of our withdrawal. But, in gauging the objective Japanese "interest" in Korea, as well as in tracing our commitment, we should realize that the present disposition is the result, not of strategic necessity, but historical accident. Even for Japan, it is only the *circumstances* of a possible change of regime in South Korea (specifically external attack, rather than internal political evolution or even revolution) that might cause serious difficulties; and even then, given Japan's sea frontier, those difficulties would be more psychological than strategic.

Finally, the United States should dissolve our security commitment to defend South Korea with military force against aggression. It may be attractive to postulate the replacement of our bilateral security guarantee with some mind of multilateral guarantee (perhaps involving China, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States). But we should not make the termination of our direct responsibility for the defense of South Korea conditional on the substitution of such a collective agreement. Even our participation in a multilateral guarantee might commit us to reintervention with military force—by definition, in the worst circumstances. In such circumstances, an American government might lack the popular mandate to enforce the new diplomatic instrument.

THE SET OF PROPOSALS I have made is not without its costs and difficult consequences. But neither of the other two major alternatives is cost-free or entirely (or even on balance) benign in its consequences. If the status quo were without serious tensions, there would be no urgent pressures for their resolution. And Carter's program is not a solution; it is more in the nature of a compromise, a composition of contradictions, the essential one being our continuing commitment to the defense of South Korea but by more remote and less reliable forces.

The potential liabilities of my favored alternative—complete, irreversible, unconditional disengagement—could take various shapes.

The principal fear of most critics is that, with our disengagement, we would lose our deterrence of North Korea and its sponsors. There could be instability on the peninsula—North Korean probes, a local arms race, another invasion, Soviet or Chinese intrusion or at least intensive support.

But South Korea should be able to defend itself from a thrust from the North. North Korea is a state with less than half the population (16,280,000) of the South (34,610,000). It is inferior in overall ground forces (430,000 against the South's 540,000); about 27 Soviet-size divisions in the North against about 22 larger South Korean divisions, including one Marine division, with the South also heavier in artillery. On the other hand, the North has an advantage in armor (roughly two tank divisions against the South's equivalent of about one). And there is the unfortunate geographical accident that the capital of South Korea is only 30 miles from the DMZ. But South Korea has well-developed fortifications athwart the few channelized major routes of attack, and it also has a sizable militia for rear-area security and reinforcement in depth. In the air, the North also has an advantage—on the face of it, 600 aircraft against the South's 204. But 370 of North Korea's planes are obsolete MiG 15/17s and IL-28s, while only 50 of South Korea's planes are the outdated F-86s, leaving a more manageable net ratio of modern aircraft of 230 North to 154 South (which includes 72 of the potent F-4D/Es). And, in any case, air forces do not directly oppose each other, as do ground units.

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The present U.S. force in Korea numbers about 43,000 and consists of a headquarters, the 2d Infantry Division deployed in reserve between the DMZ and Seoul, and about one tactical air wing, in addition to 700 to 900 nuclear warheads of various kinds. The United States has given Korea over $13 billion of military and economic assistance in the past quarter-century.

The recent Carter administration planning document, PRM-10, is reported to be pessimistic, or at least ambiguous, about the chances of the South Korean force, without American support on the ground (and especially without American air and sea power), to stop an unaided North Korean attack north of Seoul—the North's presumable proximate objective. But, on the basis of intensive, detailed, and redundant studies performed in the Pentagon and within an interagency study group eight and nine years ago—and not materially contradicted since then — I would question the newfound pessimism of the Carter administration. To be sure, a few North Korean units, lightly armed, might fight their way into the northern outskirts of Seoul; and, of course, the city would be under North Korean shellfire. But North Korean forces would not seriously penetrate the city, let alone drive South Korean forces out. Moreover, the consequences for the North of a peninsular war, even if the United States never intervened in any way, would be serious and perhaps catastrophic.

A parallel fear among critics is that we would lose our leverage over South Korea. Its internal regime might become even more repressive, and our concern for human rights would be undone. Or South Korea could compensate for the loss of American support by acquiring the capacity to build nuclear weapons.

We could lose our influence on China, by damaging its perception of our staying power, especially after our unnerving performance in the end-game in Vietnam. China, in this projection, might seek rapprochement with the Soviet Union, since the United States would be signaling its unreliability as an informal guarantor. Or China might embark on a campaign of political pressure, and even military force, around its periphery, especially in the obvious case of Taiwan. (This whole scenario is premised on the perception that China *wants* the United States to remain, in force, in East Asia—a perception that has a certain devious logic but is periodically belied by Chinese statements and actions, especially in the case of Korea.)

We would also, this critique continues, lose what control we might have over the direction of Japanese policy. In a set of mutually exclusive possibilities, either Japan would lose its nerve, turn left, and accommodate to the Soviet Union or China; or Japan would turn right and militarize, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

In a final image, the United States would lose its global credibility, as a result of its abdication from responsibility in East Asia. Its major antagonist, the Soviet Union, would become more aggressive, and there would be a further erosion of American influence throughout the world.

These scenarios cannot be simply dismissed or entirely discounted, down to zero. But, at the other extreme, each objection cannot be made a sufficient condition for utterly foreclosing the option of disengagement from Korea. Each—and all—must be weighed against the costs of either maintaining the present posture or entertaining the contradictions of the Carter administration's proposal; the risks of reinvolvement in a destructive situation on the Korean Peninsula, risks that become more dangerous as we attempt to deter an adversary by making the American response more certain, even automatic; and the fact that the entire course of contemporary American foreign policy—the quest for control—is out of phase with changes in the international system.

FOR, IN THE LAST ANALysis, judgments on a proposal of disengagement from Korea turn, not on microcalculations of the North Korean threat and the South Korean capability to defend, and not even on speculations of the possible effects on American power and status, but rather on the proposal's consonance with a more general American response to developments in Asia and to a profoundly changing international system.

In my view, our moves in Asia should have the general theme of an orderly, but thorough and irreversible, political-military disengagement. The withdrawal program of the Carter administration, as the Nixon Doctrine that preceded it, does not intend such a disengagement. Rather, these programs and doctrines can be characterized as "force substitution" or even "containment by other means." In the rhetoric of a succession of administrations, it has been presented as self-evident that the United States is a "Pacific power." But the practical implication of this is that we are involved in influencing the policy of allies and containing the ambitions of adversaries—a prescription for more Vietnams, or another Korea. In addition to this continuing involvement, with its possible confrontations and its present diplomatic frictions, there is the large expense of maintaining active forces-in-being to "fund" our commitments. And there is the prospect of having again to defend governments that we may not like and whose actions we cannot control.

Instead, we should withdraw to a mid-Pacific stance, allowing an indigenous balance to establish itself among the great territorial powers of East Asia—China, Japan, and the Soviet Union. Such a balance seems already to be possible, with the multiple initiatives and diplomatic maneuvering by Russia with Japan, and Japan with China, and the competition by the Soviets and the Chinese for the allegiance of the smaller states around China's periphery. The United States should stand clear of the determination of these competitive and collaborative struggles and schemes. We should trade, aid, and communicate—but impartially and without the distorting expectation of political or military advantage.

We should tangibly adjust our military posture to this new foreign policy. A mid-Pacific posture would imply no American forces or bases west of Guam. It would mean no military assistance to Asian clients. It would mean the phasing out of all military alliances and defense commitments—to be replaced, in some cases, with nonmilitary treaties establishing various forms of cooperation. It would mean the end of declaratory statements that commit us to intervention or the threat of intervention in the defense of asserted "interests" in Asia. Furthermore, we should not attempt to replace the American presence by presumed proxy states, particularly Japan. Nor should we involve American diplomatic effort in the establishment of substitute regional associations. If such evolve, we might look benignly upon them, or ignore them; we should not acquire a stake in their creation or orientation. Of course, it should go without saying that such moves are to be accomplished in a phased manner, over the next five or more years, and that they will be carried out with diplomatic tact and imagination, and full consultation and candor.

*AS WE HAVE SEEN, PRO*ponents of the status quo react to suggestions like these with mutterings of "irresponsibility." But why don't they dwell, for a moment, on the present situation, which also has its costs and consequences? If we had not yet arrived, by a bizarre historical accident, at our present commitment to South Korea—to this nation of 36 million talented but rather difficult people, with their unfortunate government, halfway around the globe, and separated, luckily, by a rather wide ditch from almost anything else we might be interested in, including Japan—would any member of Congress rise to propose that the United States solemnly undertake to defend this entity against all its external and internal enemies? Would he propose that we make good on that commitment at a cost of more than 35,000 American lives and perhaps $200 billion, or suggest that we dispatch, in perpetuity, a significant portion of our air force, nail down a reckonable part of our Pacific fleet, and increase our entire force structure by about one-sixth and our "Asian" general purpose forces by almost double, at an incremental cost of about $12 or $13 billion a year? That is, would any member rise to propose all this and still hope to be credited with his sanity or sobriety, let alone his "responsibility"? ❑

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Cancer is often curable. The fear of cancer is often fatal.



Some people are so afraid of cancer they won't go to the doctor when they suspect something's wrong. Or even for a routine checkup.

They're afraid the doctor will "find something."

This fear can prevent them from discovering cancer in the early stages when it is most often curable.

There are over 3,000,000 people alive today who have had cancer. If that surprises you, it shouldn't. Cancer is highly curable.

American Cancer Society

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

Handgun Control: Prohibition Revisited

A liberal's argument against a favorite liberal panacea

By Don B. Kates, Jr.

CHICAGO, MAY 1975. FOR no apparent reason a stranger began shouting abuse at a young mother who was traveling with her children on an "L" train. After the two uniformed officers present detrained, he threw her to the floor and began dragging her down the aisle, while the conductor and five other passengers did nothing. Drawing a "Saturday night special," she shot him in the shoulder and held him for police.

Chicago again, October 1976. Returning to her apartment, Ms. W found a man who had entered by battering down a wall, and had raped her roommate and thrown her out the 15th-story window. When Ms. W drew a gun, which she carried because she felt the neighborhood was bad, the attacker fled.

These examples highlight my reasons for disagreeing with my fellow liberals who urge a national handgun ban. My concern is not with the self-defense value of handguns, but with the much more fundamental question inherent in banning them: Do we really want to punish these women and others like them for keeping handguns to defend themselves and their families? Furthermore, how could the enforcement of such a law possibly be effective or fair?

Perhaps we would be marginally better off if even responsible people didn't have guns for sport or protection—just as we might be better off if even the responsible didn't drink or use pot socially. But the cure, as I will attempt to demonstrate, would be worse than the disease, because it would severely punish millions of responsible people—which is what would be required to make a handgun ban effective.

There are more than 50 million handguns in circulation today, and, at a conservative estimate, more than half of the owners would defy a national confiscation law.[1] These figures alone suggest the vast number of problems that would arise if a handgun ban were enacted.

The most obvious inference to be drawn from these figures is that the overwhelming majority of gun ban resisters will not be criminals in any ordinary sense. They will be people who believe (whether rightly or not) that they have both a constitutional right and a need to possess handguns for self-defense. As Frank Zimring, the leading academic proponent of a handgun ban, acknowledges, fewer than one-half of 1 percent of all owners misuse their handguns. (Of course, even one-half of 1 percent of 50 million allows for a staggering amount of crime, particularly since the same gun may be used to commit 80 or 100 robberies, year after year. But reducing the overall number of handguns will not reduce the number of guns criminals have because criminals are not about to give them up.) But we aren't talking here about one-half of a percent; as I have already suggested, the number of those who would defy a handgun ban would be more like 50 percent of 50 million.

This brings us to the problem of enforcement: Effectively discouraging such noncompliance would require a law with real teeth. (The gun-banner's ideal is a proposal—recently defeated overwhelmingly by Massachusetts voters—for a *mandatory* minimum year in prison for any citizen caught with a handgun.) But the mere threat of punishment would not be enough to deter handgun owners who believe that they need their weapon for the protection of their family in a violent society. Compliance could be achieved only by enforcement so vigorous that resisters would be more frightened of the law than of living without the security of a handgun. Simple mathematics demonstrates the staggering cost of

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1. This estimate is taken from a 1975 national poll in which 92% of the respondents opined that less than half of all gun owners would comply with a national gun ban. While the public's prediction in this area is entitled to special weight, experience with state handgun registration laws suggests that the public may be unduly optimistic. Registration laws are viewed by many gun owners as only a step away from eventual confiscation. In 1968 Chicago police estimated that two-thirds of the guns there were not being registered under the state's new mandatory registration law; statewide noncompliance was estimated at 75%. More recently, Cleveland police estimated that more than 88% of that city's handguns had not been registered, as required by a 1976 ordinance.

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such enforcement. Jailing only 1 percent of those likely to resist would be far beyond the resources of the federal prison system. Clearly an across-the-board enforcement of a handgun ban would be too costly—and in the end, impossible.

We already know the probable result of such an impossible situation: selective enforcement. Our experience with sex and pot laws teaches us that when the cost and injustices of enforcing a ban grossly exceed the benefits, confidence in the law among police and prosecutors, judges and juries—not to mention the citizenry itself—rapidly fades. Enforcement becomes progressively more haphazard until at last the laws are used only against those who are unpopular with the police. We hardly need to be reminded of the odious search and seizure tactics police and government agents have often resorted to in order to trap violators of these laws.

Alternatively, those responsible for carrying out the laws can simply look the other way. Even now prosecutors and juries will often not impose sentences for violations of gun laws already on the books. It should be noted that the women whose cases are cited above were already carrying guns in violation of state and local law. The young mother was not charged at all, while charges against Ms. W were dropped "in the interest of justice" when her case attracted national publicity. It is hardly an argument *for* a highly punitive national ban that some prosecutors and juries would use the law to jail people it wanted to "get" for other reasons, while other police and judicial bodies would mitigate the law's harshness by not enforcing it.

IF THESE ARGUMENTS seem familiar, it is probably because they parallel the standard liberal argument against pot laws. I am not surprised, though, that some of my fellow liberals balk at applying these arguments to gun bans. Gun prohibition is the brainchild of white middle-class liberals who are oblivious to the situation of poor and minority people living in areas where the police have given up on crime control. Such liberals weren't upset about marijuana laws, either, in the fifties when busts were confined to the ghettos. Secure in well-policed suburbs or high-security apartments guarded by Pinkertons (whom no one proposes to disarm), the oblivious liberal derides gun ownership as "an anachronism from the Old West."

A woman reporter doing a series on gun control recently received an earful of such talk (somewhat more conservatively flavored) from St. Louis police brass. But repeating it to patrol officers, she got only ridicule. The men who actually work the ghetto told her that the police cannot keep order—self-protection is all that ghetto residents can rely on. The officers spoke even more forcefully by their actions. Although she does not ordinarily have difficulty finding male company, she couldn't persuade any off-duty officer, black or white, to escort her into the housing projects to do interviews. Patrolmen police them only as required by their jobs—and then only armed, with a partner for backup, in shotgun-equipped squad cars, which they rarely leave. Is it any wonder that Ms. W carries a gun for self-defense? By no means do I suggest that it is always wise for the armed citizen to resist a thug or even to pursue and try to capture him. On the one hand, armed shopkeepers often foil robberies; according to Chicago police figures, civilians justifiably killed almost three times as many violent criminals there in the past five years as did police. The preliminary data run on my civilian self-defense study finds armed civilians capturing, wounding, killing, or scaring off criminals in 75 percent of several hundred reported confrontations while the police success rate was only 61 percent.

On the other hand, victims who resist robbery are much more likely to be injured themselves (though resistance without a firearm is twice as hazardous as resistance with one). Whether resistance is wise may depend upon the victim's circumstances. Avoiding injury will be paramount to a white, liberal academic with a comfortable bank account. It will necessarily be less important to the casual laborer or welfare recipient who is being robbed of the wherewithal to support his family for a month—or to a black shopkeeper who can't get robbery insurance and will be literally run out of business by successive robberies.

Turning from robbery to rape, we encounter the only currently acceptable vestige of the sexist mythology about women and machines. The notion that a woman who resists with a gun will have it taken away and used on her cannot be supported by a single documented example from any study of rape. As women increasingly adopt life-styles independent of male protectors, they find pistols a great deal more useful for self-defense than scientifically worthless studies full of sexist mythology. In all probability had Ms. W's roommate relied on a gun, she wouldn't have been raped and thrown out a window.

Last but not least, depriving honest citizens of the means to help their victimized neighbors promotes a public philosophy that assisting crime victims is police business—don't get involved. Historian Lee Kennett has noted that before New York banned handguns, instances of Good Samaritans coming to the aid of victims were frequent. Contrast that with the 44 New Yorkers who did nothing to aid Kitty Genovese during the 15 minutes she screamed while being stabbed to death. Contrast it also with a survey recently recounted in *Psychology Today* of Good Samaritans in other states who *did* come to the aid of crime victims: An amazing 81 percent own guns. Unlike others, the Samaritans "are familiar with violence, feel competent to handle it and don't believe they will get hurt if they get involved."



Gun prohibition is the brainchild of white middle-class liberals who are oblivious to the situation of poor people living where police have given up control.

OBLIVIOUS TO THE SITuation of minorities and the poor, the liberal prohibitionist imagines all gun owners to be like the redneck paranoids whose ravings occasionally appear in newspaper letter columns. But, as the Decision Making Information (DMI) organization's 1975 national survey of handgun owners finds, "the top subgroups who own a gun *only* for self-defense include blacks (almost half own it for this reason alone), lowest-income group, senior citizens." Minority and underprivileged people don't express their opposition to gun bans in letters to the editor, but in the hard-earned money they spend for guns. They are not about to give them up, no matter what laws we pass. These are the people it is proposed we jail because they insist on keeping the only protection available for their families in areas in which the police have given up.

But what about all the evidence that handgun bans, if enforceable and rigorously enforced, greatly reduce violence? Alas, I can find no such evidence, nor do I believe any such evidence exists. Gun control is a plausible *theory*. But there are other equally plausible theories, some of which suggest that gun laws do not reduce violence, some that they may even increase it. Before we turn a plausible theory into a federal law that jails people for mere ownership of guns, we had better see how that theory has

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worked out in actual practice. But this is a subject on which gun prohibitionists remain prudently silent.

They prefer to parrot endless statistics on the use of handguns in crime—leaving the implication that banning them would materially reduce violence. To determine whether a ban would have the desired effect, the federal government funded at the University of Wisconsin the most massive and sophisticated study ever done of gun laws in practice. Reported in October 1975, its "conclusion is, inevitably, that gun control laws have no individual or collective effect in reducing the rate of violent crime."

Likewise the only in-depth study of Britain's handgun ban, conducted at Cambridge University in 1971, finds that it has had no ascertainable effect upon violence. Indeed the British homicide rate has doubled in the last 15 years while the American rate has risen less than 30 percent in 45 years. (If, despite the fact that theirs are escalating faster, British violence rates remain far below ours, it is only because the British started far lower—in the era before Britain banned pistols.) Noting that "the use of firearms in crime was very much less [before 1920] when there were no controls of any sort," the Cambridge report concludes that social and cultural factors, not gun control, determine violence levels. Thus the report recommends "abolishing or substantially reducing controls" because their administration and enforcement divert immense police resources from real crime control.

It is frequently theorized that murders would not occur if handguns weren't lying around for ordinarily law-abiding citizens to grab when they lose their tempers. To test this, the Wisconsin study compared homicide rates to rates of handgun ownership, state by state. It found *no correlation*. In other words, rates of homicide do not decrease as rates of handgun ownership decrease, nor do they increase as rates of handgun ownership increase. Note that this finding undercuts the whole theory of handgun prohibition. If reducing handgun ownership does not reduce homicide or other violence, a handgun ban is just one more diversion of police resources from real crime to victimless crime.

The Wisconsin study's national evidence is reinforced by the Harvard study of a 1974 Massachusetts law providing a mandatory year in prison for having a handgun without a permit. The study found that during 1975 this widely publicized law sharply reduced the carrying of firearms and the number of assaults with firearms. Having swallowed the prohibitionist theory that this would sharply reduce homicide, the authors were surprised to find no corresponding reduction in any kind of violence! As previous criminological studies have suggested, deprived of a handgun, a momentarily enraged citizen will resort to the far more deadly long gun. Deprived of all firearms, he will prove almost as deadly with knives, hammers, etc. Focusing on weapons avoids the real issue—radically changing the institutions and cultural patterns that produce violent people.

This Harvard study was released in mid-1976 by criminologist and law professo James Vorenberg, who headed the 1966 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. Professor Vorenberg, who had been a supporter of gun controls, was recently quoted as emphasizing the lack of empirical evidence for them: "I think we can try to persuade [the citizen] he'll be better off without a gun, but I think it's wrong for us to keep preaching to him with no facts to back it up."

On examination, the "evidence" for handgun prohibition boils down to the fact that most of the progressive intellectual or political figures of our day detest guns and seek their elimination. But opinions and emotions, however unanimous, are not evidence. And they certainly don't justify jailing otherwise law-abiding people, who —like those two Chicago women—act upon different opinions.

BEFORE TAKING THE prevalent liberal view on gun bans as our guide, we might reflect that the prohibition of alcohol enjoyed far longer and more impressive liberal support. From William Lloyd Garrison, Frederick Douglass, and Susan B. Anthony to Jane Addams, William Jennings Bryan, and Eleanor Roosevelt, Prohibition was the solution of four generations of American liberals—the brightest and the best, the most progressive and humane intellectual figures of their times—for, among other things, personal violence, particularly domestic homicide. The Prohibition movement began in the early nineteenth century as part of a great liberal crusade whose other objectives were abolition of slavery and emancipation of women. Later Prohibition advocacy went hand in hand with the successor causes of Reconstruction, civil rights, and women's suffrage.

Today's liberal gun prohibitionists unknowingly duplicate the theories and even the rhetoric of yesterday's liberal alcohol prohibitionists. Banning a commodity associated with violence (liquor then; handguns now) is touted as the quick, simple alternative to changing—over several generations—the attitudes and mores that make our society so much more violent than those of Western Europe. Then, as today, examples of tragic domestic violence were emotionally hurled at those who argued that something valued by millions should not be banned because a minute number abuse it. Legislative rejection of Prohibition was invariably attributed not to popular opposition but to the sinister machinations of The Liquor Lobby. In fact liquor was a major industry in nineteenth century America and did actively lobby against Prohibition; whereas handgun manufacture is not a major industry today and manufacturers have supported gun laws.[2] The "gun lobby" actually consists of millions of gun owners who besiege their legislators with angry letters whenever such legislation is introduced—something that, if it occurred in behalf of any other cause, we liberals would describe as democracy in action.

Handgun and liquor prohibition arguments share two crucial but erroneous assumptions: (1) social evils like violence, irresponsibility, and drug or alcohol abuse are "caused" by the availability of certain weapons or drugs rather than by complex social conditions that produce people inclined to misuse them; and (2) by eliminating whatever weapon or drug happens to be most currently popular, the social evils "caused" by it will also disappear or at least be substantially reduced.



Banning a commodity associated with violence is touted as a quick alternative to changing the attitudes and mores that make our society so violent.

Taking these wrong-headed assumptions as true, the "life-saving" argument for prohibiting liquor even today is far more impressive than that for prohibiting handguns. Liquor is a factor in more homicides than are handguns (64 percent to 51 percent). Liquor takes more lives yearly in automo-

2. *Smith and Wesson recently reendorsed what has become the major proposal of the National Coalition to Control Handguns: British-type mandatory licensing. Enraged opponents of gun bans have initiated a nationwide boycott of S&W products—apparently forgetting that S&W and the six other major American gun manufacturers originated this proposal in 1968, before the National Council even existed. That year's federal Gun Control Act was the product of an alliance between gun controllers and the domestic gun industry to ban importation of high quality foreign military surplus handguns. (Low-cost quality foreign handguns are still importable because they don't compete with the domestic manufacturers' high-cost quality market.)*

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

Antigun liberals seem to have learned nothing from our Prohibition experience or even from their own cogent arguments against marijuana bans.

bile accidents (25,000+) than do handguns in homicide (13,000+) and suicide (10,000+) combined. Liquor also plays a large part in the other most frequent causes of accidental death each year: falls (16,500+); drowning (7,000+); fires (6,500+); and gun accidents (2,500+). And this is without even considering the psychologically crippling and often physically debilitating, or even fatal, effects of liquor upon our 10 million alcoholics and 35 million heavy drinkers.

Turning to the enforceability issue, the gun prohibitionist argument so closely parallels Prohibition theory that it might have been taken directly from the speeches of William Jennings Bryan or Jane Addams. Antigun liberals seem to have learned nothing from our Prohibition experience or even, amazingly enough, from their own cogent arguments against marijuana bans. They swallow whole the myth that no matter how deeply valued a commodity is, it can be eliminated by drastic penalties massively enforced. Like the prohibitionists of old, their faith is never shaken by the persistent failure of state legislation based upon this myth. To their minds this only argues for a national gun ban which would, they are confident, be enforceable.

THE MOST FAVORABLE possible climate for enforcement of gun bans is surely England, an island, relatively small, isolated and well policed, which has not had a major war in more than 30 years. Yet the Cambridge study found that "50 years of very strict controls on pistols has left a vast pool of illegal weapons" in Britain. Consider our own federal law against the submachine gun, a weapon which never had many civilian sales when it was legal, since it has no legitimate sporting or self-defense use and was inordinately expensive. Nevertheless, submachine guns are easily acquired today by lunatic-fringe groups like the Symbionese Liberation Army and at comparatively lower prices than before they were nationally banned more than 40 years ago. How then could we ever hope to coerce the elimination of handguns, which have been available since 1835 and of which there are more than 50 million in America today?

The problems of enforcing a handgun ban far exceed those we experienced in enforcing the Prohibition Amendment. Unlike liquor, a handgun is a single-purchase item; properly cared for, it can last hundreds of years. Admittedly, the effective life of ammunition often will not exceed 30 years. But it would be impossible for police to stop handgun owners from purchasing a handful of ammunition each generation, when Prohibition agents could not prevent the distribution, sale, and resale of millions of gallons of liquor each month.

Since compliance cannot be coerced by enforcement, the question becomes one of voluntary compliance—which, in fact, is the only way any of our laws work. The Cambridge report found that compliance occurred among law-abiding Britons *only* because England was so peaceful when handgun prohibition was adopted that few considered guns necessary for self-defense. As I have already suggested, 50 percent noncompliance is a very conservative estimate of the likely response in our violent society to a national gun law.

How would Congress react to the massive defiance of a handgun ban? The example of foreign countries—and of states like Michigan and Missouri that have British-type permit laws—is not encouraging. The Cambridge study notes that every new British firearms act has brought the police unheard-of new powers of search and seizure. In Holland, Taiwan, Northern Ireland, Rhodesia, South Africa, Jamaica, and the Philippines (to name a representative few), gun laws are enforced by indiscriminate search. The situation is little better in Missouri, where (according to the American Civil Liberties Union) St. Louis police have conducted 25,000 searches in recent years on the theory that any black driving a late model car has an illegal gun; or in Michigan, where almost 70 percent of all firearms prosecutions are thrown out by the appellate courts on grounds of illegal search.

Predictably, the failure of gun laws in other countries to contain violence has resulted in ever more savage penalty schemes. Last year a Malaysian court sentenced a young man to death for having a pistol. (The sentence was later commuted.) Since 1968 Rhodesia has imposed the death sentence on scores of blacks for the violation of firearms laws; the violation of such laws also means the death penalty in Taiwan and the Philippines. Several years ago a Jamaican court sentenced an American tourist to life imprisonment because a single .22-caliber bullet was found in a suitcase he had borrowed from a friend back home.

LIBERAL PROHIBITIONists will protest that they do not propose extreme penalties or unconstitutional enforcement. Neither—originally—did the proponents of marijuana bans. Tell that to the millions of Americans who have had their doors broken down, their houses ransacked, their phones tapped, or their privacy otherwise invaded by police looking for drugs. Tell it to the thousands who have been jailed under ever escalating marijuana penalties—including the Virginia prisoner who was just pardoned after serving five years of a 120-year sentence for selling less than an ounce. A Detroit police official recently published an article advocating abolition of the Fourth Amendment, so that a federal handgun ban can be enforced by general searches.[3] The escalation of penalties and of repugnant police practices is virtually inevitable when laws enacted with great expectations (but in defiance of empirical evidence) fail to stop crime. For just as the zealots now cling to the plausible theory of gun bans despite the steadily increasing factual evidence of unworkability in practice, so will they continue to believe that "just one more" escalation will bring us to their utopia, in which no one has guns and no one murders.

We will approach that utopia only when violence rates have dropped to the point at which people no longer feel they need guns for protection. That, as the Cambridge study tells us, was the happy situation that enabled Britain in 1920 to go—with minimum resistance—from virtually no gun control to complete prohibition. Unfortunately neither right- nor left-wing ideologues are willing to deal with the fact that that utopia cannot be brought about by easy, mechanistic solutions—whether these be gun bans, abrogating defendants' constitutional rights or quantum leaps in the numbers of snoopers and informers. Violence can be decreased only through painful, basic, long-term change in the mores and institutions that produce such an unusually high percentage of violence-prone individuals in our society. If we are unwilling to make such sweeping change, we must reconcile ourselves to living in a violent society—a society that has no right to prevent victims from arming themselves against the violence it could eliminate, but has chosen not to.

3. *In fact the September* Harper's *carried an article by a leading proponent of handgun bans who urged that police indiscriminately round up pedestrians and herd them through airport-type gun-detection devices.*

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FULL DISCLOSURE, by William Safire. Doubleday, 525 pp., $10.95.

While Agnew waited

JOHN EHRLICHMAN

RICHARD NIXON FELT MOST comfortable with people who were clearly pigeonholed. In the larger categories, there were the friends and the enemies. Among the friends, were subclasses with little or no overlapping: There was the staff and there were social friends. On the staff there were those who were "strong" and there were the ones who "didn't have their heads screwed on straight." Among the speechwriters on the staff there were the libs (Ray Price) and the hardliners (Pat Buchanan).

Here and there a hybrid survived among the appointees, usually because of actual or apparent ability: Pat Moynihan, the conservative liberal; John B. Connally, the Republican Democrat; Elliot Richardson, the pragmatic idealist.

William Safire was the unclassifiable speechwriter in a stable of white draft horses and black draft horses, one of no certain coloration who could be hitched to almost any assignment—a sort of palomino of the palindrome. He worked hard and fast. Even his earliest drafts of a speech were clear and clever, often a genuine pleasure to read. Nixon suspected Safire was a liberal, but he could never really prove it. Because Bill delighted in the felicitous phrase, some of his copy was turned back by his patron for being too clever—"too Sorensenesque"—and some assignments were denied him in favor of Ray Price when Nixon decided he needed the-lift-of-a-driving-dream copy.

But certainly, when the need arose, Safire could handle any assignment well. He was invariably called upon to do the economics speeches. He was the writer the president, Arthur Burns, and John Connally took to Camp David when the New Economic Policy was hammered out in 1971; there he wrote the speeches explaining the institution of wage and price controls, tax changes, and closing the gold "window."

At times he was harnesssed in tandem with Pat Buchanan in crafting missiles for the Spiro Agnew war machine. While Buchanan's speeches often hit with the finesse of a herd of charging dinosaurs, Safire had Agnew turning phrases that rapiered the bad guys.

In my opinion the best book written thus far about the Nixon presidency is Safire's *Before the Fall*. But I admit a bias; the book is written by a friend of mine. Too few people read that illumination of Nixon and the presidential institution. In fact, *Full Disclosure* is Safire's first best-seller. Its success is well deserved. This is the story of President Sven Ericson, from the time he is blinded in a helicopter crash until he decides whether or not to step out of office because of his disability. He is a bachelor president who has a woman photographer who loves him a lot and a cabinet which includes ambitious men who don't.

AS IN MOST GOOD NOVELS about the Washington scene, Safire's characters act out a shadow play that suggests the truth about the power centers there.

President Ericson has his problems with his vice president, Arnold Nichols. The verisimilitude of their relationship is one of the major strengths of the book. Safire's blind president is confronted with countless reasons to resign: He has an awful time stumbling and bumping about at press conferences; bill signings are a chore; he can't tell who is saying what to him; and he and the beautiful Buffie, girl photographer, are rele-

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gated to a feeling for each other.

Why doesn't Ericson step aside? The strongest reason for his reluctance is very similar to the reason that Richard Nixon felt ensured him against impeachment for a while: Look who was vice president. So *Full Disclosure*'s President Ericson withstands heavy pressure upon him to step down; as in real life, the heaviest blows are landed by his own partisans. Safire's clever dénouement rings true and implies much about the impossible constitutional relationship between any president and his vice president.

Early in *Full Disclosure* the vice president is waiting for *it*. The helicopter crash was almost *it*, but the president survived.

Whether he admits the truth of this characterization to himself or not, every vice president is waiting for *it*. And every president knows his vice president is sitting around in one of his three plush offices, surrounded by an unnecessarily large staff, drawing a large salary, doing almost nothing of any importance except waiting for the president to die. That's not exactly an institutional relationship calculated to cultivate mutual confidence and harmony.

A vice president is the White House's tonsils. He has virtually no necessary function but is often the locus of inflammation and disease. More legislative than executive by strict constitutional definition, his only explicit duty is to preside over the Senate when he wishes to. A president may assign the vice president things to do. As President Nixon soon learned, however, the vice president need not accept such assignments. He is, as Mr. Agnew often pointed out to us, "a constitutional officer" who need take orders from no one.

For decades presidential candidates have promised to make the vice president a "full partner," "deputy president," or "total participant" in the presidency. Up to and through the Nixon years, those promises have been broken by each succeeding president and vice president. Kennedy's Johnson was as frustrated and unused as Johnson's Humphrey. Hundreds of hours of the Nixon staff's time were spent on the Agnew relationship. Nixon himself was continually trying Mr. Agnew's square peg in one round governmental orifice after another. At the nadir of his tolerance for Agnew, Mr. Nixon spoke to me more than once of his desire to induce the vice president to resign so that John Connally might take his place. Nixon even considered offering Agnew a seat on the Supreme Court to get him to move. The specter of the senatorial confirmation process chilled that idea.

Congressman Udall and David Broder have recently noted the similarity between the first months of the Carter administration and the comparable portion of the Nixon first term. It would be interesting to compare the publicity releases of the Nixon communicators during that time concerning the role of Vice President Agnew with the Carter handouts and Mondale interviews on the incumbent vice president's activities.

A vice president is the White House's tonsils. He has virtually no necessary function but is often the locus of inflammation and disease.

LIKE MOST STRUCTURAL FLAWS, the ruptures and wounds between president and vice president take time to appear. Some can be concealed indefinitely. Most Americans wish Messrs. Carter and Mondale complete harmony. (Mr. Carter's job is obviously difficult enough for him.) If they have achieved harmony and can maintain it, and if they can keep their respective staffs from open war, they will have done so in spite of the flawed structure of their constitutional relationship, not because of it.

Harmony depends upon the vice president's willingness totally to subordinate his ambitions, opinions, and preferences to the president's decisions. If he ever eats of the apple of the tree of knowledge of good and evil which grows in the light well of the Executive Office Building, the serpent will whisper to him that he, too, is a constitutional officer, elected by all the people —and then the cracks will appear in the façade.

One day when Mr. Agnew was particularly busy sowing tares in our garden of intergovernmental relations, as was his wont, it occurred to me that perhaps the nation could be persuaded to go for a small constitutional amendment. If the Constitution did not designate the vice president to be president of the Senate (in Article I, Section 3, clause 4), there would be not a single reason for a newly elected vice president to stay in Washington after the inauguration.

To save wear and tear on the president and his staff, why not send the new vice president back home to wait for *it?* He or she might be paid a reasonable stipend, but it need not be a huge sum, since a vice president would have time to farm, make furniture, or otherwise earn a respectable income. Or, he might take a job that involved coping with OSHA or the BIA or the FTC at the far end of the federal pipe. If he did that, and eventually succeeded to the presidency, wouldn't bureaucrats' heads roll like apples!

Such a physical separation from the president has much to recommend it. The Grim Waiter is a constant reminder of the chief executive's mortality. That doesn't bother most people, but it obviously bothers presidents. If the VP weren't hanging around all the time looking underutilized, no staff person would then be given the job: "Figure out what the vice president can be doing." Nor would anyone need to be the bearer of the president's messages (as I sometimes was):

"I'm sorry, Mr. Vice President, but the President does not agree with your recommendation that Frank Sinatra be Director of the Bicentennial Commission" (this actually happened in 1973).

How nice it would have been if Mr. Agnew had been up there in Maryland, doing whatever, not going around making speeches, not taking calls from governors and mayors, not pressuring the General Services Administration about contracts or the Justice Department about judges, just up there being one of the folks.

Maybe, unlike Mr. Agnew, or Vice President Nichols in Bill Safire's book, Vice President Mondale is going to prove that if you have the perfect man for the job everything will work out fine.

Full Disclosure is a good story; the descriptions of how things work in Washington are worth the price. Safire is still a sucker for the cutesy phrase at times (Buffie's sexual confession is "in the parking lot of the ballpark of truth," he says), but his feel for the White House rivalries and power plays is true.

It's such a good book, in fact, that you'll forgive Bill Safire when you discover that the fellow who ultimately gets the girl is the president's speechwriter. At least that's more believable than if the vice president got the girl. ❑

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TOP SECRET: National Security and the Right to Know, by Morton Halperin and Daniel Hoffman. New Republic Books, 158 pp., $8.95 hard cover, $3.95 paperback.

Behind closed files

MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON

*IF MORTON HALPERIN AND DAN*iel Hoffman have their way there will be an Eleventh Commandment: Thou shalt not classify.

In their book *Top Secret: National Security and the Right to Know,* Halperin and Hoffman, both at the Center for National Security Studies in Washington, D.C., give Congress a blueprint for legislation it is doubtful Congress will ever have the guts to put into effect. Perhaps the simplicity of the authors' notion will render it unworthy of congressional undertaking. But a more basic fact ensures that this plan will never reach Capitol Hill: the Congress's continuing abdication of its responsibility in matters of national security.

The key to the Halperin-Hoffman plan for deciding which information is released to the public, and which information is kept secret, is the categorization of information into three different types: (1) that which is automatically released (which would be nearly everything); (2) that which is presumptively classified; and (3) that which requires exercise of discretion. Information that would be automatically released includes data about American troops stationed abroad; Americans engaged, or about to be engaged, in combat; the cost and deployment of nuclear and conventional weapons; and the existence, budgets, and function of intelligence organizations. The authors would allow the classification of the details of ongoing diplomatic relations, the technical aspects of weapons systems, the names of spies, and intelligence codes.

In Halperin and Hoffman's plan, Category 3 would deal with unavoidable gray areas on a case-by-case basis. The authors attempt to finesse the consequences of the grayness here by trusting that the classifying official will most often decide in favor of release. Their hopeful single paragraph on this area of potential abuse is their weakest argument. Any plan for a truly effective opening of the system should not contain such an easy out for classification-happy bureaucrats.

Halperin and Hoffman recognize that their recommendations represent a major reversal of the current bureaucratic notion that knowledge of government operations is best restricted to those with the power to classify whatever comes onto their turf. Instead, the changes enumerated in *Top Secret* would, by giving the public the data indispensable for intelligent choice, open debate on the policies of government to those who are governed.

*HALPERIN AND HOFFMAN AL*so delve into the corrupting aspects of the privilege of secrecy itself, in which "there often lies an attitude of contempt for Congress and the public. Officials who are in possession of precious secrets unknown to the man in the street easily come to believe that they have the duty and privilege of lying to protect those secrets. Ultimately the protection of this privileged status begins to seem an end in itself. . . ," They further point out that the capacity to leak information selectively is often used to fortify particular interests, rather than to enlighten the public. The authors also provide a historical perspective in their review of recent disastrous secret ventures. The list is not new: the Pentagon Papers, Cambodia, and Angola.

Because of my involvement with the investigation of our role in Chile, I can add a personal account of the anguish engendered by discovering the reprehensible activities the government has undertaken. In 1974, I simply sought to read the testimony given in closed session by the then CIA Director William Colby concerning the agency's activities in Chile. My colleagues evidenced no desire to act on the information he had provided them. They were more concerned with a possible violation of the confidentiality of Mr. Colby's testimony than with the absolute violation of Chilean civil rights. After I had read the testimony, subsequent leaks of this information to the press were falsely attributed to me. The focus of outrage then became me, as supposed messenger, rather than the contents of the message. There is no reason to discuss, in this review, all the comic opera elements of my ensuing travail. But what emerged from my experience, what is documented in *Top Secret,* is how willingly congressmen become partners in the game of being shown if they don't tell.

Halperin was wounded in the front line of the dirty tricks battle. He recently won a somewhat Pyrrhic victory in the courts against his former boss, Richard Nixon, for bugging him. Even with this history, however, *Top Secret* lacks vitality and immediacy—it gives no sense that one of the authors was there. But perhaps we can be grateful that Halperin has turned his experience into something substantive instead of

A plan should not contain an easy out for classification-happy bureaucrats.

a money-making *roman à clef* or a volume of anecdotes replete with photos.

One amusing passage, which relieves the dryness of the book, illustrates the sometimes Alice in Wonderland quality of government secrecy. In it Nixon and cohorts attempt to come up with an acronym that would be synonymous with the phrase "top secret," yet carry some weight, since the "top secret" designation is so overused as to be meaningless:

Nixon: ". . . Don't use Top Secret for me ever again. I never want to see Top Secret in this God Damn office. . . . Uh—Why don't we just say 'National Security,' I—maybe you're right. 'National Se-Security'—not TOP SECRET. 'National Security,' uh—or 'Special National

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Security,' or, uh, it's something like that. But anyway, get that. So that it's just three letters. Like, uh, 'SN S—,' 'SNS' or something like that. . . ."

IRONICALLY THE PUBLICATION of *Top Secret* coincides with the release of the draft of an executive order entitled "National Security Information and Material," in which President Carter takes it upon himself to determine how to "balance the public interest in access to official information with the legitimate need to protect information which should be kept secret in the interest of national security." Among other things, this order defines the elusive differences among "Top Secret," "Secret" and "Confidential." The differences are that the disclosure of information classified as such "could reasonably be expected to cause" respectively: "exceptionally grave damage to the national security," "serious damage to the national security," or "significant damage to the national security." Since my dictionary gives roughly synonymous definitions for "grave," "serious," and "significant," it would be interesting to know the degrees of catastrophe that would be engendered by the release of the different material.

Since one of the refrains of candidate Carter was that of bringing openness to government, this proposed Executive Order of President Carter provides a perspective on the tenacity of the government's desire for secrecy. It also provides an illuminating contrast to the Halperin-Hoffman formula. This latest draft is a replacement for a national security executive order instituted under Richard Nixon. Both orders are intended to limit the number of people allowed to classify, to open up the secrecy process. Under the Nixon order, the number of those with the authority to classify was reduced to 13,977 from 59,316. Despite this reduction, in 1976 there were 800,000 *more* classification actions than during the year before. I hope the current reshuffling does not continue this inversion.

Page 18 of the draft contains the timetable for declassification of material. It also includes this exemption: "Material originated by a President or a President's White House staff or material in the possession and control of the Administrator of General Services . . . is exempted from this review if such material is less than ten years old." Although this exemption may disappoint those desiring a more open government, it should keep the rubber stamp industry happy. In view of the activities the Executive has taken upon itself to conduct in secret in the past, this exception dangerously nullifies the accountability the draft supposedly strives for.

The Carter draft does make a stab at freedom of information: "Where there is doubt as to whether certain information requires any security protection, the classifying official will strike the balance in favor of public access to official information and the information shall not be classified." But it would be a rare bureaucrat who would take the responsibility of releasing information that might bring about any of the 13 catastrophes which could result from disclosure, enumerated in the draft's guidelines.

As recent American history so painfully illustrates,the greatest attacks on our system of democracy have come from our own government. Paranoid excesses of classification have been used again and again to keep the public ignorant of policies conducted in its name. Halperin and Hoffman wish to return knowledge and responsibility to the people. Unless action is taken, continuing governmental deception will inevitably lead to continuing disaster. ❑

IMPERIAL BRAIN TRUST: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy, by Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter. Monthly Review Press, 334 pp., $17.50.

The business of foreign affairs

JONATHAN MARSHALL

NO ACADEMIC ENTERPRISE IS more valuable than that which seeks to demystify the social and political processes that profoundly affect our lives. Especially since the Vietnam War emerged as a national issue, radical and revisionist historians and political scientists have convincingly challenged traditional analyses of American foreign policy, exposing the continuity of economic objectives behind America's twentieth century expansion and the unreality of claims that our foreign policy has been based primarily on altruism or legitimate security interests. But rarely have they brought together historical and sociological analysis to show the concrete process by which corporations and members of the upper class determine their interests, devise effective programs for their accomplishment, and obtain government implementation of those programs.

Shoup and Minter bridge this gap brilliantly, showing us precisely how class power is translated into practical political decision-making. The great value of their analysis lies in demolishing the conception of freely competing interest groups as a means of explaining the real foreign policy process. In reality, vastly more significant is a tiny number of wealthy and influential Americans, particularly those represented in the great corporations, banking houses, and law firms of New York, who meet together in the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) to study foreign problems and reach a consensus on ways to resolve them. This socioeconomically exclusive club, unrepresentative of labor, small business, farmers, women, and other groups, exercises a disproportionate influence in the halls of government, thanks to the enormous political and social power of its combined membership.

The degree to which the CFR interlocks with the other elements of the American ruling class is astonishing. A random sample of its connections: U.S. Steel (8 directors are CFR members), Exxon (6), International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation (5), Chase Manhattan (8), J. P. Morgan (8), Sullivan and Cromwell (8), Committee for Economic Development (22 percent of its members are also in the CFR), RAND (9 of 20 trustees), Foreign Policy Association (31 of 74 directors), and the Rockefeller Foundation (14 of 19 trustees). Curiously enough, up until now (with the exception of William Domhoff's work), it has been radical *right-wing* groups that have been most responsible for drawing attention to, and attacking, the CFR, which they see, predictably, as the nerve center of an international Communist-capitalist conspiracy to impose World Government rule on the planet.

The CFR, founded in 1921, merged an exclusive New York business club with a group of internationalist foreign policy experts who had advised Woodrow Wilson during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Almost immediately it established itself as the preeminent private foreign policy institution. Even in the earliest years, its influence could be measured by the prestige of its journal, *Foreign Affairs*, by the large number of world leaders and U.S. government officials it attracted to its private meetings, and by the numerous members who went into government service. Since 1945, almost half of all top foreign policy officials in government have been CFR members; one need think only of such members as Henry Kissinger, Walter Mondale, Cyrus Vance, and Zbigniew Brzezinski to see that the council's voice is heard at the highest levels. Finally, the CFR extends its influence throughout the country by sponsoring regional Committees on Foreign Relations, which encourage local opinion leaders to share the internationalist and interventionist bias of the CFR itself.

THE CFR'S OVERALL IMPOR- tance stems from its ability to define for the rest of the country the nature of the "national interest." Shoup and Minter pointedly observe that the "national interest," treated by many academics as some sort of disembodied, objec-

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This exclusive club exercises a disproportionate influence in the halls of government thanks to the enormous political and social power of its combined membership.

tive fact known through observation, is in fact a profoundly political formulation upon which concrete foreign policies are built. They elaborate:

> The very idea of "national" interest assumes that everyone's interests are identical, or nearly so, and this is far from true in a capitalist society. The working class and upper class have very different interests at home and abroad. The working class is most concerned with domestic society and change: redistribution of income and wealth, full employment, worker control of industry, and more egalitarianism generally. The capitalist class, on the other hand, has an interest in preventing basic changes in society. . . . Since domestic problems can be solved through foreign expansion, without alteration of the domestic system from which the corporate upper class obtains its power and privilege, it has a much greater interest in foreign policy.

Unfortunately, this passage also reveals the weakness of their rather naive Marxian analysis, since foreign policy interests rarely divide neatly across class lines. Capitalists based in the domestic market may resent heavy taxation to support lavish foreign economic and military aid programs or expensive "police actions." They may recognize that, as in the Vietnam War, foreign expansion can be as divisive as it is unifying. And specific corporations may promote short-term policies at odds with the long-term interests of the multinational corporate community. Nor is organized labor so free from foreign policy interests: On matters of import control, capital exports, development of foreign labor unions, and access to foreign raw materials, it takes a strong stand. Labor, too, can be divided, as beteeen those with an interest in government defense or foreign aid expenditures and those without. And there are, of course, also the economic and power interests of the state's own bureaucratic and military establishments to consider. In short, foreign policy cannot be reduced to a simplistic Marxian class analysis.

On the other hand, Shoup and Minter admirably demonstrate that the narrow but powerful corporate interests represented in the Council on Foreign Relations have used the organization to reach a consensus on large foreign policy issues and successfully implement their policies through the government. In a masterful chapter, they document how the CFR, in World War II, came to dominate the government's secretive and extremely sensitive postwar planning apparatus—a stunning achievement for a private organization. As early as 1940, the CFR won acceptance for its "Grand Area" notion of the national interest; this concept called on the United States to use rearmament and "economic supremacy" to achieve "unquestioned power" in order to dominate the economic resources of all of the world not under German control. Although the CFR explicitly favored the vague and idealistic Atlantic Charter to soothe public fears of a new American imperialism, in private its members were more candid. CFR President Norman Davis, a friend of Roosevelt and head of one State Department planning committee, asserted in 1942 that "the British Empire as it existed in the past will never reappear and . . . the United States may have to take its place." General George V. Strong of the same committee stated flatly that the United States "must cultivate a mental view toward world settlement after this war which will enable us to impose our own terms, amounting perhaps to a pax-Americana." Shoup and Minter demonstrate that these imperialistic ambitions brought the United States first into conflict with Japan (over competition for the economic resources of China and Southeast Asia) and later with the Soviet Union, which rejected the American attempt to incorporate Germany and even Eastern Europe into its sphere of influence. (This is not to say, of course, that the economic interests of *most* Americans—even of most American capitalists—were served by the war with Japan or the cold war with Russia.) The authors document the council influence behind the creation of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, the formulation of the Marshall Plan, and the decision to impose a "soft" peace on Germany.

EXTENDING THEIR WORK TO the postwar period, Shoup and Minter discuss, with less success because crucial documents are still unavailable, the impact of CFR studies on the Cuban missile crisis, policy towards Southern Africa, and the Nixon administration's shift on China policy. An especially fine chapter explores how the CFR's early interest in Southeast Asia, as a vital source of such raw materials as tin and natural rubber, laid the basis for National Security Council decisions to raise the level of U.S. involvement in Vietnam during the 1950s. By the late 1960s, concern among CFR members as to the impact of the war on the balance of payments and domestic protest led the Johnson administration to a crucial reexamination of its war aims and ultimately to the peace talks that brought the war to an end.

As the American government's global power declines, its foreign policy will become much more difficult, for its policies can no longer be imposed almost by fiat on the rest of the world. In recognition of the increasing complexity of the world situation, the CFR has recently embarked on a massive, lavishly funded reexamination of world power alignments and of the U.S. role in the next decade, called the *1980s Project*. At the same time, CFR Chairman David Rockefeller has formed the Trilateral Commission, which brings together elites from the Atlantic world and Japan to coordinate their policies for more effective action against the Soviet Union, OPEC and the Third World; its potential influence is illustrated by the fact that President Carter, Vice-President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, and National Security Adviser Brzezinski all served in the commission. Shoup and Minter rightly see in both the 1980s Project and the Trilateral Commission sophisticated attempts to construct a new global order conducive to the interests of the democratic, industrialized nations and the economic interests that largely direct their foreign policies. But neither attempt looks very promising. World events are moving much too rapidly to permit any but the most general and vacuous plans for the next decade, especially now that the United States cannot force world events into the mold envisioned by its planners. Nor does it seem likely, in this era of trade rivalries and political jealousies, that the advanced capitalist nations can reach a significant consensus through the Trilateral Commission. The CFR and its sister organizations continue to dominate the process of foreign policy decision-making in the United States, but its era of great successes, like the short-lived "American Century," is over.

IN THIS WILD WATER: The Suppressed Poems of Robinson Jeffers, by James Shebl. Ward Richie Press, 474 S. Arroyo Parkway, Pasadena, California 91105, 123 pp., $9.95.

Edited out

RADCLIFFE SQUIRES

THERE EXISTS A NO MORE DEvout congregation than the idolators of Robinson Jeffers's poetry. These zealots, whose motives are not so critical or scholarly as theological, sense in the erosion of his literary reputation collusion with the devil. In the attacks upon his rhetoric and concepts, they smell heresy. Their devotion has been rewarded by the publication of James Shebl's *In This Wild Water*. Right up the celestial alley.

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Shebl's reason for writing one more book on Jeffers centers in revisions, prompted by the publisher, along with the expunging of 10 poems from Jeffers's original manuscript of *The Double Axe* (1948). That book was a tired and troubled one. He himself wrote that it showed the scars of World War II. It does not belong with his best collections. Nevertheless, one can find interest in the correspondence between Jeffers and his editors, Saxe Commins and Bennett Cerf, at Random House on the matter of the excised poems, as indeed one can be interested in the excised poems themselves, which Shebl includes in his book. One should compliment Shebl for his labors in ferreting the poems out of the library holdings of the University of Texas. But at the same time one may feel some doubt about the importance Shebl claims for them.

Professor Shebl insists that the 10 excised poems were necessary for a full understanding of the intent of the long two-part title poem as well as of Jeffers's "doctrine of inhumanism." He goes on to suppose that the removal of the poems constituted political censorship on the part of Random House. His first point is dubious, if only for the reason that Jeffers's intent throughout *The Double Axe* is clear enough. Jeffers deplores America's entry into World War II, blames that entry about equally on the stupidity of leaders and the gullibility of the people, while sardonically viewing the whole process as inevitable. Nor do the "suppressed poems" add anything to our perception of Jeffers's inhumanism, which has been evident since the publication of *Roan Stallion* (1925). The doctrine is basically an attack on twentieth century secular humanism and its insistence on an anthropocentric bias. The doctrine proposes that the exclusively human bias leads to "introversion," a condition which he so often symbolized as incest that Lincoln Steffens once referred to Jeffers's house at Carmel as his "incestral tower" (a remark, incidentally, that Robert Frost liked to pass off as his own).

AS TO THE CLAIM OF POLITICAL censorship, though Shebl here is on less shaky ground, he is not exactly on firm ground. Certainly, it seems obvious that Saxe Commins, an establishment liberal, applied some pressure on Jeffers not only to agree to the excisions but also to make alterations in the text. Commins wrote to Jeffers, expressing his distress at the isolationism and the impudent references to the late President Roosevelt. He hoped "for the sake of your book and the effect it will have that you can temper these references before we think of beginning composition." Commins added, however:

> Please understand that this is in no way, and I can't make this too emphatic, an attempt to intrude upon your rights as a free artist. It is meant to be the friendliest of suggestions made with the hope that you can be persuaded to my strongly personal views. I would hate, above everything else, to have you of all people to be linked with reactionary elements in America. That would be unthinkable.

Jeffers complied with Commins's suggestions, even going so far as to accept one of his emendations of a line. However, in the end Random House added a "Publisher's Note" to *The Double Axe,* dissociating itself from Jeffers's views. The note is outrageous, silly, and—to my knowledge—unprecedented, but neither the note itself nor any of the correspondence adds up to indubitable censorship. The whole matter is muddied by the fact that the poems Jeffers dropped from the collection are rather badly written, as if he had remembered only the first clause of Wordsworth's statement to the effect that "poetry should be written in the language of the essay when it is well written." The uncertainty is increased by the fact that no publisher is required to accept and publish any book, while tradition allows a publisher to make suggestions intended to improve a book.

At any rate, Jeffers did accept Saxe Commins's suggestions without notable protest. Why? Shebl believes that "the logical explanation seems to be that Jeffers gave in to editorial judgment as a function of his inhumanism. Peace of mind was an imperative for him and went far to explain his acquiescence in the matter." That is a very odd statement. For one thing it is difficult to read Jeffers's poems and assume he either felt or tried to obtain peace of mind. Furthermore, if an inhumanist's peace had been his aim, then publication of his poems would not have been of any importance at all to him. No, I suggest that Jeffers may have liked the polemical quality of the poems, but had too much critical sense to hold them important as poems. The fact is, *The Double Axe* would have been a better book for more strenuous cutting. Had the whole, rather hysterical first part of the title poem been dropped, the magisterial position of the second part might have emerged more surely.

Jeffers's reputation will rest finally upon a dozen or so splendid poems, among which "The Eye," from *The Double Axe,* might repose. Not the tides of literary fashion, not the dogmas of the devoted congregation, nor yet the political bias of an editor will have anything much to do with establishing that canon. Ironically, that will be the work of a censor, the final and most severe censor —time.

The Eye

The Atlantic is a stormy moat; and the Mediterranean,
The blue pool in the old garden,
More than five thousand years has drunk sacrifice
Of ships and blood, and shines in the sun; but
here the Pacific—
Our ships, planes, wars are perfectly irrelevant.
Neither our present blood-feud with the brave dwarfs
Nor any future world-quarrel of westering
And eastering man, the bloody migrations, greed
of power, clash of faiths—
Is a speck of dust on the great scale-pan.
Here from this mountain shore, headland beyond
stormy headland plunging like dolphins
through the blue sea-smoke
Into pale sea—look west at the hill of water: it is
half the planet: this dome, this half-globe,
this bulging
Eyeball of water, arched over to Asia,
Australia and white Antarctica: those are the eyelids
that never close; this is the staring unsleeping
Eye of the earth; and what it watches is not
our wars.

ROBINSON JEFFERS

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New York Film Festival II

STEPHEN HARVEY

AT AN EVENT LIKE THE NEW York Film Festival, calm discussion of the films that are merely good or bad has an inevitable tendency to get lost in the din generated by the annual sensations—those movies which demand attention through sheer audacity, if nothing else. This year, as soon as audiences had ceased reeling from the noxious impact of Pasolini's *Salò*, they duly girded themselves for the belated U.S. premiere of Bertolucci's **1900**, last year's *cause célèbre* from Cannes to the Venice Biennale.

The American admirers of the director of *The Conformist* and *Last Tango in Paris* had by now despaired of ever seeing the master's epic for themselves, after the imbroglio that followed Bertolucci's delivery of a lumbering five hours of social history to his thunderstruck producer, who refused to release anything for American consumption weighing in at more than three hours and a quarter. Finally a compromise four-hour, English-language version was wrought and breathlessly dispatched at the last possible moment to the New York Festival. Having survived both American and European versions, I can testify that *1900* remains dinosaurlike: While managing to ambulate through a great deal of terrain, it is apparently governed by an intellect whose dimensions approximate those of a wizened pea.

The scope of *1900* is nothing if not ambitious. In Italian the title literally means *twentieth century*, which indeed is the modest little topic Bertolucci has measured out for himself. Set in Reggio-Emilia, Bertolucci's home province, *1900* reenacts in microcosm the 50-year struggle of the rural peasants to free themselves from the yoke of the landowning aristocracy. Sun-dappled Part One covers the two decades prior to the advent of Mussolini, while wintery Part Two details the grim times that preceded the Liberation, with a brief, symbolic epilogue leading to the present. As we have learned from our own overlength, bloated-budget forays into the historical saga, the form presents certain pitfalls—characters and events tend to be reduced to lurid monochromatic strokes in a vast panorama that encompasses too much while focusing on nothing in particular. *1900* is a particularly woeful example, because Bertolucci intended to combine history with political gospel—the film is no more or less than a fervent, four-hour paean to the rise of the Italian Communist Party.

Accordingly, every character is reduced to the baldest pamphleteering archetypes. The aristocrats (paterfamilias Bert Lancaster and grandson Robert De Niro) are well-meaning, perhaps, but self-absorbed, offhandedly cruel, and ultimately ineffectual. The working classes, represented by Sterling Hayden and Gérard Depardieu, are a leftist intellectual's untrammeled dream—eternally sage, strong, progressive, and altruistic. There is the token decadent bourgeoise (Dominique Sanda), too much the weak-willed individualist to commit herself to the class struggle. Most predictable of all are the fascists, represented by Donald Sutherland, with his patented bulging eyes and pendulous lips, and Laura Betti, the Wicked Witch of the West in countless Italian art-house efforts. They are gargoyles pure and simple—the latter-day equivalent of the Huns that tried to violate Little Mary Pickford in *The Little American* 60 years ago.

IT'S AWFULLY DIFFICULT TO SUSTAIN any interest in these creatures over a period of four hours because their moral colors blaze unmuted from the moment they're introduced until the final fade-out. With the singular exception of Sterling Hayden, Bertolucci's extraordinary roster of actors is too constrained by the lock step of ideology to do much more than strike the requisite attitudes. Everyone is further sabotaged by the abominable, dubbed sound-track, as usual saddling its unwitting victims with riotously uncolloquial dialogue intoned in computerized internationalese. Those who provided their own voices are hoisted by their own vocal quirks; De Niro's slurred New Yorkisms could hardly be less suited to invoke the faded specter of Italian gentility, while Dominique Sanda's modernist vamp is undercut every time she emits that uninflected *Mitteleuropa* monotone of hers.

It could be argued that these are just intended as figures in an allegory in which the broad truth expressed is supposed to be greater than the sum of its human parts. However, it is on the political level itself that Bertolucci abuses his audience and negates his own best instincts as a film-maker. Like all propaganda, *1900* conveniently ignores historical fact to create a more inspiring vision of "reality." It's a relatively minor lapse to imply, as this film does, that the partisans singlehandedly defeated Mussolini and the Germans (a notion that, at the time, might have amused the Allies), but Bertolucci's treatment of fascism is really unconscionable. To pretend that the fascists were one and all a handful of bogeymen from nowhere, unanimously loathed by the salt of the earth, the "people," is nothing but a convenient and comforting lie—it lets everybody off the hook. In the process Bertolucci reduces a conflict of great complexity to a standoff between the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, which is no more persuasive dramatically than it is plausible historically.

Bertolucci's movies have always had a political core, but what made the likes of *Before the Revolution*, *The Conformist*, and *The Spider's Stratagem* so compelling was the sense that no struggle is as clear-cut as it seems, people being far more complicated than movements and rhetoric. One of the great ironies of *1900* is that a film ostensibly about liberation should be so intellectually oppressive. The members of the audience clearly aren't trusted to puzzle anything out for themselves—every symbol and revealed truth has been so thoroughly predigested that there is room left over solely for reaction, never for thought.

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1900 has been accurately described as a kind of Italian *Birth of a Nation* or *Gone With the Wind* in ideological reverse. The reactionary gospels according to D. W. Griffith and David O. Selznick have survived for audiences all these years thanks to the virtuosity of the first and the grandeur of the second, despite their political perversity. The same may yet hold true for *1900*, as the lyric artist within Bertolucci wrestles with the ideologue possessed by a Mission. Like his mentor Visconti, whose *Senso* and *The Leopard* this film intermittently resembles, Bertolucci's vision has an operatic intensity and momentum to it, the camera eye surg-

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ing past hyperanimated figures in bright green landscapes and murky, overstuffed interiors. The profligate sweep of imagery manages to sustain itself long after the ideas have expired from fatigue; yet even visually *1900* succumbs to Comintern kitsch after a certain point. Frozen into the appropriately uplifting poses, the icons of the proletariat seem to have been lifted straight out of the worst examples of that "socialist realism" beloved by Stalin four decades age, while the banner-waving tableau finale resembles nothing so much as *The Red Detachment of Women* alla Bolognese. Bertolucci isn't the first artist to lose himself in the mire of political engagement, and he surely won't be the last. Meanwhile, one can hope that Bertolucci's rumored desire to make a sequel bringing *1900* up to date will evaporate into a gust of hot air, rather than congealing into five more hours of turgid celluloid.

IF FURTHER EVIDENCE HAD BEEN required to show that less can indeed be more as far as movies are concerned, the unheralded arrival of Claude Goretta's almost unbearably poignant ***The Lacemaker*** provided it in full measure. A Swiss director previously noted for *The Invitation* and *The Wonderful Crook*, Goretta, like his compatriot Alain Tanner, has been overshadowed recently by the Big Noises from Germany and Italy who know a weighty subject when they see one and have outsized idiosyncrasies to match. *The Lacemaker* could hardly be more unprepossessing—it's simply the quiet story of a youthful love affair gone awry. Yet just as Tanner's *Jonah Who Will Be 25 in the Year 2000* turned out to be last year's most invigorating movie, I doubt that anything as touching as *The Lacemaker* is likely to come along again for quite a while.

Perhaps *The Lacemaker*'s most remarkable feature is the fact that Goretta manages to make credible the kind of unadulterated innocence that hasn't been seen in the movies since Janet Gaynor in *Sunrise,* a half-century ago. The title refers to the rustic subjects of eighteenth century portraiture, and indeed the heroine, Pomme, seems to have been plucked unawares by some capricious stork out of some simpler time into the self-indulgent present. An introverted teen-ager who contentedly lives with her widowed mother while working as the underling-of-all-trades in a Parisian beauty shop, Pomme possesses deep recesses of feeling but hasn't acquired the skill to bring them to light in words. She is so self-effacing that, naturally enough, it takes another innocent to notice her at all. While vacationing with the desperate swinger she works with, Pomme encounters a shy, slightly overrefined university student, whose erudition conceals his own lack of experience with the opposite sex. He is immediately drawn to her fragile sweetness while remaining faintly embarrassed by her lack of education and ambition. Eventually, he rejects her for not possessing those qualities which she never pretended to have in the first place; the effect is as devastating for Pomme as it was unintended by the young man, who simply overestimated her resilience.

In other hands this might well have been unbearable, but Goretta's subtle gift for characterization never allows the material to founder in facile effects. For all her purity, the heroine isn't the least bit cloying, while the student is hardly the callous boor one might have expected—merely immature and a bit self-centered. Throughout, Goretta maintains a discreet emotional distance from his subject, and the film is all the more moving for the viewer because it hasn't been presoaked in the glycerine tears of a director. He has also had the insight to cast the heretofore unknown Isabelle Huppert in the principal role. Actress and part merge so thoroughly that one might easily assume it was just a case of perfect typecasting, a notion immediately dispelled during her forthright, articulate appearance at the festival press conference, which followed the first screening. As with much great movie acting, Huppert doesn't seem to be *doing* anything in particular; with a wistful half-grin etched on her face, the essence of this character seems to emanate from the pores of her skin. Those responsible for the likes of *Bobby Deerfield* should be forced to sit through a week's worth of screenings of *The Lacemaker,* and learn what the genuine article is all about.

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*A LOSING NIGHT AT THE FESTI-*val is traditionally devoted to the latest work of one of the enshrined European favorites. This year the position of honor was reserved for Luis Bunuel, whose ***That Obscure Object of Desire*** again proved that after nearly 50 years of film-making, he still hasn't lost the power to astonish. Every so often one hears ominous rumblings from abroad of Bunuel's intention to retire—an eminently logical impulse considering that the man is nearly 80, his vision and hearing partially impaired for some years now. All of which makes *That Obscure Object of Desire* that much more remarkable, for contrary to all laws of probability, it turned out to be one of the most exuberant and contemporary efforts to premiere during the entire festival.

Once more Bunuel has turned to a favorite theme, namely the fatal lure of sexual obsession, here drawing from Pierre Louÿs's antique novel *La Femme et le Pantin* for inspiration. This is hardly the first time this arcane work has been adapted for the screen; the Sternberg-Dietrich *The Devil Is a Woman* was based on it, while such disparate types as Geraldine Farrar and Brigitte Bardot have likewise assumed this temptress's tatty mantilla at one time or another. Once again, her victim is a paradigm of bourgeois respectability (underplayed to perfection by Fernando Rey), but Bunuel's perverse enchantress is played by both Carole Bouquet and Angela Molina, representing the alternately self-possessed and tempestuous sides of her nature. Whereas Dietrich enticed and repelled her prey out of sheer wanton caprice, the motives of Bunuel's schizoid creation are a bit more ambiguous; they have something to do with the terrorist explosions giddily detonated in Rey's vicinity at regular intervals. (He, of course, is too absorbed in his passion to regard it all as anything more than a tiresome nuisance—time bombs tend to cause traffic jams, apart from everything else.)

This caustic tale is cheerfully related by the hero in flashback to an eclectic assortment of strangers on the train he believes to be carrying him out of Conchita's orbit once and for all. The laconic and grim epilogue, however, shows us how mistaken he is. This final sequence, consisting merely of Rey and Bouquet/Molina's excursion to a shopping arcade to watch a mysterious woman embroidering in a display window, is as suspenseful as any of the vintage Hitchcock set pieces; Bunuel's command of images and editing would put any 10 directors half his age to shame. This film is far more self-contained and conventionally crafted than is usual for Bunuel, and purists expecting the expansive satire and surreal, anecdotal structure of *The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie* may be a bit disappointed by *That Obscure Object of Desire.* However, its casual gallows humor and sheer narrative skill should suffice to please practically everyone else.

OUT AND AROUND

Julia—Lillian Hellman's autobiographical saga of politics and friendship, carefully preserved in amber. Thanks to Fred Zinnemann's stolid tableaux and an exceedingly cluttered plot structure, the movie Hellman becomes even more of an enigma than the elusive title character. Jane Fonda never manages to get past the externals, but Vanessa Redgrave's agonizing display of passion and commitment in a frustratingly brief appearance almost manages to redeem everything else.

Roseland—All the world's a dance hall, and all the people in it merely looking

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for the right partner. James Ivory's fey sentimentality is most definitely an acquired taste, but so unabashed that ultimately it's hard to resist. Ingratiating performances by almost everyone concerned, particularly Lilia Skala as the grande dame of the geriatric Champagne Hour, and Broadway's eternal soubrette Helen Gallagher, in her film debut as an all-knowing dance instructor.

Looking for Mr. Goodbar—From Judith Rossner's persuasively deadpan novel, Richard Brooks has wrought a jangling melodrama that is to sex what *Reefer Madness* was to marijuana. Each incident in the ill-starred heroine's life is heavily underscored with Significance, the gist of which seems to be that casual sex is the fatal scourge of the seventies. Yet with its one-note characterizations and back-lot artificiality, *Goodbar* really harkens back to all those "daring" problem pictures of the 1950s. A subdued Diane Keaton does intelligent work under the circumstances; still it's depressing that the most entrancing film comedienne since Judy Holliday and the young Audrey Hepburn should finally be so lauded for the kind of Oscar-begging virtuosity that any young actress worth her SAG card could bring off.

Handle with Care—Resuscitated by the New York Film Festival after it bombed in the hinterlands last summer, this free-wheeling tale of life in CB country is the surprise charmer of 1977. A standard B-picture assortment of libidinous gym teachers, overgrown boy scouts, and bigamous truckers are observed with unerring wit and affection by a young director named Jonathan Demme. The result has more skill and truth than the overblown likes of *Julia* and *Goodbar* put together.



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
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